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INTRODUCTION
This Article is about the fear of the queer child. The
simplest version of this fear is the claim that exposing
children to homosexuality
will
“turn”
them
into
homosexuals,1 but the fear is more refined, varied, and
capacious than this terminology suggests. It includes the
fears that exposing children to homosexuality and gender
variance will make them more likely to develop homosexual
desires, engage in homosexual acts, form homosexual
relationships, deviate from traditional gender norms, or
identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. In one
form or another, these are all fears of the queer child.
As historian David Halperin writes: “We can only
defuse these fears if we are willing to analyze them, to
understand them, to figure out where they come from, what
their institutional basis is, and—perhaps most important of
all—how they are connected systematically to the social and
discursive structures that organize our culture.”2 Taking up
Halperin’s call, this Article historicizes the fear of the queer
child in an attempt to dispel it. The Article shows that
although the fear of the queer child is thousands of years
old, it has been subtly transformed in the last fifty years.
For centuries, the fear had been articulated almost
exclusively in terms of seduction—as the claim that children
could be sexually initiated into queerness by engaging in
1. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
2. David Halperin, Deviant Teaching, in A COMPANION TO LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND QUEER STUDIES 146, 166 (George E. Haggerty &
Molly McGarry eds., 2007) [hereinafter Halperin, Deviant Teaching].
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homosexual activity with adults. Evidence of this belief can
be found in many times and places, but it became an
especially prominent social, legal, and political justification
for anti-LGBT policies in the modern era.
During the 1970s, religious conservative opponents of
LGBT rights reformulated the fear of the queer child in
response to the rapid rise of the LGBT movement. Rather
than falling back on the age-old fear that children could be
seduced into queerness, the movement’s opponents
introduced more palatable claims of indoctrination, role
modeling, and public approval into public debates over
LGBT rights. The indoctrination fear is that LGBT adults
will actively recruit and proselytize children into queerness,
in a deliberate attempt to increase the population of LGBT
people. The role modeling fear is that children will learn to
imitate queerness by identifying with influential LGBT
adults, such as parents and teachers. The public approval
fear is that by granting equal rights to LGBT people, the
government will teach children that queerness is
acceptable—an “alternative lifestyle” that children should
feel free to adopt.
Since the earliest days of the LGBT movement,
advocates for LGBT rights have responded to these fears by
claiming that they are empirically false—based upon myths,
lies, and misunderstandings. They have insisted that
sodomy laws have nothing to do with children, marriage
laws have nothing to do with schools, and children raised by
lesbian and gay parents are no different than children
raised by heterosexual parents. Tying these claims together,
LGBT advocates have argued that a child’s sexual
orientation and gender identity are fixed early in life and
cannot be learned, taught, chosen, or changed.
The trouble with the LGBT movement’s empirical
response has long been apparent: it is defensive; worse still,
it is apologetic. It attacks the factual premise that
queerness can be contained, but it fails to challenge the
normative premise that queerness should be contained.3
3. See Michael Boucai, Sexual Liberty and Same-Sex Marriage: An
Argument from Bisexuality, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415, 473-74, 481 (2012)
(arguing that opposition to gay rights is premised upon the goal of
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Like the immutability claim upon which it is based, this
response amounts to an assurance that queerness is not
contagious, rather than an assertion of an individual’s equal
liberty to be queer or straight.4 Even if only for the purpose
of argument, it entertains the troubling assumption that
queerness is immoral, harmful, or inferior, and thus that
the state may legitimately discourage children from being or
becoming queer.
To be sure, this vice can also be viewed a virtue: by
focusing on the empirical question of how children become
queer, LGBT advocates have allowed both sides of the
struggle over LGBT rights to save face,5 by forestalling a
normative debate about whether it is optimal or tolerable
for more children to be queer. Advocates have calculated
that in the current social, legal, and political climate, they
can win more victories sooner by invoking empirical studies
on children’s sexual and gender development, rather than
asking voters, judges, and politicians to celebrate the
possibility that more and more children may become queer.
This Article examines how the struggle for LGBT rights
arrived at this tactical impasse and identifies a paradigm
for moving beyond it. If we do not learn the history of this
fear, we may remain imprisoned within it—condemned to
repeat our empirical claims to exhaustion, without
confronting the premise that children are better off straight.
The Article has five parts. Part I provides a theoretical
backdrop for my argument by defining how the Article uses
the terms “fear,” “queer,” and “child.” Parts II and III
provide a brief historiography of the fear. Part II explores
the fear’s premodern origins and modern rise, while Part III
examines the fear’s reconceptualization in the contemporary
period. This narrative sets the stage for the Article’s
“containment” and that advocates prefer to rebut this goal “with empirical
rather than normative arguments”).
4. Cf. Susan R. Schmeiser, Changing Immutable, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1495,
1520-21 (2009) (arguing that the immutability claim amounts to a plea for civil
rights because “we can’t help it”).
5. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay
Discourse and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327,
1377-79, 1388-89 (2000).
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normative challenge in two ways. First, it establishes links
among the opposition’s claims of seduction, indoctrination,
role modeling, and public approval, which might otherwise
appear to be logically and historically distinct from each
other.6 By showing how kinder, gentler themes emerged
from older, harsher claims about the sexual transmission of
queerness, this history discredits the new by associating it
with the old.7 Second, this narrative helps explain why the
LGBT movement has struggled so mightily to show that the
fear of the queer child is empirically false. By explaining
how the fear has flourished for so long, this history sheds
light on the reasons that the LGBT movement has been so
cautious and anxious about how to attack it.
Part IV indicates that the time may be ripe to consider
new strategies because the LGBT movement’s empirical
strategy has begun to show signs of strain in recent years.
While the fear of seduction has been debunked by legal and
scientific authorities, the fears of indoctrination, role
modeling, and public approval are still commonplace, and
they seem less vulnerable to the LGBT movement’s
empirical challenges. After decades of studies, debates over
children’s sexual and gender development remain unsettled
in significant respects, and they are not likely to be resolved
in the foreseeable future. Rather than relying only on the
claims that children cannot be influenced by teachers,
parents, or the state, LGBT advocates should consider
challenging the premise that children are better off straight.
Part V lays out a theoretical framework within which
such a normative challenge could be developed. It begins by
acknowledging that even in the days of Anita Bryant’s
“Save Our Children” campaign, there were already activists
and scholars who asked, “so what if children grow up to be
6. Cf. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 (citing testimony of historian George
Chauncey to place Proposition campaign advertisements about children turning
homosexual into “historical context as echoing messages from previous
campaigns to enact legal measures to disadvantage gays and lesbians”).
7. See Reva Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2179 (1996) (arguing that when a new movement
successfully contests the justification for a status regime, the regime will
“translate” the justification into more socially acceptable terms).
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queer?” Rather than claiming that children’s sexual and
gender development cannot be influenced, they have
insisted that the possibility of children becoming queer is
neither legally nor morally relevant. In the new
millennium, this claim has been taken up by a handful of
legal scholars, lawyers, and judges, reflecting a broader
shift in cultural attitudes toward children’s queerness.
Borrowing from Lisa Duggan’s Queering the State, this Part
theorizes these new claims under the banner “No Promo
Hetero.”8 It insists that the state must adopt a neutral
position vis-à-vis children’s straightness and queerness,
because it has no legitimate reason to presume that
straightness is superior to queerness—neither in childhood,
nor at any age.
I. NAMING THE FEAR
This Part briefly defines the terms “fear,” “queer,” and
“child” in order to establish a conceptual framework for the
historical and theoretical arguments that follow.
A. Fear
For readers who are familiar with queer theory, this
Article’s title may call to mind Fear of a Queer Planet,9 an
anthology that has become one of the field's defining texts.
This is no accident: by adopting the term “fear,” this Article
means to link the fear of the queer child to the broader
prejudices against queerness, in which opponents of LGBT
rights object to the spread of homosexuality and gender
variance among people of all ages. In particular, the term
“fear” signals that objections to the possibility of children’s
queerness are based on nothing more than a sense of
apprehension or dread—a feeling of anxiety toward a
possibility that is always already presumed to be harmful or
dangerous.10 To refer to such sophistry as an “argument,” a

8. Lisa Duggan, Queering the State, 39 SOC. TEXT 1, 8-9 (1994).
9. FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS
Warner ed., 1993).

AND

SOCIAL THEORY (Michael

10. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 458 (11th ed. 2003).
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“concern,” or an “objection” would give too much credit to
the fear’s premises.
B. Queer
In queer theory’s founding text, Epistemology of the
Closet, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick argued that modern
understandings of homosexuality have been characterized
by “internal incoherence and mutual contradiction” along
two axes.11 The first contradiction is between “minoritizing”
and “universalizing” views; the second is between “gendertransitive” and “gender-separatist” views.12 This Article uses
the term “queer” to indicate that although the fear of the
queer child is riven by the same contradictions, it most often
defines homosexuality in universalizing and gendertransitive terms.
1. Universalizing. First, the term “queer” signals that
when opponents of LGBT rights articulate the fear of the
queer child, they typically conceptualize homosexuality in
universalizing terms: rather than conceding that “there is a
distinct population of persons who ‘really are’ gay,” they
insist “that apparently heterosexual persons and object
choices are strongly marked by same-sex influences and
desires, and vice-versa for apparently heterosexual ones.”13
Instead of referring to the risk that children will “become”
lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender, opponents of LGBT
rights often speak of children being “confused,” or “seduced,”
or “indoctrinated” into the “homosexual lifestyle.”14 In doing
so, they present homosexuality as a temptation to which
any child could potentially yield, rather than an innate or
immutable characteristic of a “small, distinct, relatively
fixed” group of children who “are,” or may be properly
identified as, lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender.15
11. EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 1 (1990).
12. Id. at 1-2.
13. Id. at 85.
14. See Teemu Ruskola, Minor Disregard: The Legal Construction of the
Fantasy that Gay and Lesbian Youth Do Not Exist, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 269,
270 (1996).
15. SEDGWICK, supra note 11, at 1.
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Until recently, the universalizing view of homosexuality
in childhood was so commonplace that the very notion of a
“gay child” remained something of a paradox.16 In her book
The Queer Child: Growing Sideways in the Twentieth
Century, queer theorist Kathryn Bond Stockton deftly
traces the representation of children’s gayness and
strangeness through twentieth-century novels and films.17
Situated within the fields of queer theory, literature, and
film studies, Stockton’s work offers the startling insight
that before the new millennium, there had been few if any
representations of gay children in legal or historical texts.18
On the one hand, authorities maintained that children were
presexual, and thus lacked a sexual orientation of any kind;
on the other hand, they insisted that heterosexuality was
the natural result of sexual development, a process through
which any child could and should become heterosexual.19
Within this framework, a child’s homosexual desire or
behavior could be nothing more than a passing phase—a
bump on the road to heterosexual adulthood.
Stockton notes that since the millennium’s turn, it has
become increasingly commonplace to speak of “gay youth,”
“gay teens,” and “gay adolescents,”20 but references to the
“gay child” are still exceedingly rare. More and more, gay
adults are now willing to posit themselves as a gay child in
the past tense—such as when one of Oprah Winfrey’s guests
says that “He Knew He Was Gay at Age 4.”21 Yet there are
still few bona fide images of gay children in the present
tense—identities asserted by the child herself, in the period
prior to adolescence.22
As the LGBT movement has progressed, the boundary
between childhood and adulthood has continued to function
16. Ruskola, supra note 14, at 280.
17. KATHRYN BOND STOCKTON, THE QUEER CHILD: GROWING SIDEWAYS
TWENTIETH CENTURY (2009).
18. See id. at 9, 16, 19.
19. See id. at 7.
20. Id. at 10.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 7.

IN THE
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as a fault line, providing opponents of LGBT rights with an
all-purpose excuse for rejecting the movement’s objectives.
While many people have embraced a minoritizing view of
homosexuality in adulthood, they have maintained a
universalizing view of homosexuality in childhood.23 In an
essay provocatively titled Straight Talk About Gays, one
psychologist explained: “Surely decency demands that those
who find themselves homosexual be treated with dignity
and respect. But surely, too, reason suggests that one guard
against doing anything which might mislead wavering
children into perceiving society as indifferent to the sexual
orientation they develop.”24
2. Gender-Transitive. In addition, the term “queer”
indicates that opponents of LGBT rights typically
conceptualize homosexuality in gender-transitive terms:
rather than distinguishing sharply between children’s
sexuality and gender, they tend to conflate homosexuality
with gender variance by presenting “same-sex object
choice . . . as a matter of liminality or transitivity between
genders.”25 By most accounts, the term “queer” incorporates
people who are transgender—and more broadly, people who
are gender variant—in addition to lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals.26 By referring to the fear of the “queer” child,
23. See Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, How To Bring Your Kids Up Gay, 29 SOC.
TEXT 18, 23 (1993) [hereinafter Sedgwick, How To Bring Your Kids Up Gay]
(“There are many people in the worlds we inhabit, and these psychiatrists are
unmistakably among them, who have a strong interest in the dignified
treatment of any gay people who may happen already to exist. But the number
of persons or institutions by whom the existence of gay people is treated as a
precious desideratum, a needed condition of life, is small.”).
24. E.L. Pattullo, Straight Talk About Gays, COMMENT. 22 (Dec. 1992); see
also Joshua Dressler, Gay Teachers: A Disesteemed Minority in an Overly
Esteemed Profession, 9 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 402 (1977) (“[A]lthough a majority of
the public generally opposes such discrimination, it strongly favors
discrimination when contact with youths is involved.”) (citing a 1977 Gallup Poll
finding that a majority of respondents favored laws protecting gay people from
discrimination in employment, but more than two-thirds remained opposed to
employing gay people as teachers).
25. SEDGWICK, supra note 11, at 1-2.
26. Lisa Duggan, Making It Perfectly Queer, 22 SOCIALIST REV. 1, 20 (1992)
(“The notion of a ‘queer community’ . . . is unified only by a shared dissent from
the dominant organization of sex and gender.”).
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rather than the fear of the “gay” child, this Article signals
that children’s variance from traditional gender norms falls
within the fear’s ambit.27
As many scholars have observed, the conflation of the
concepts of sex, gender, and sexual orientation is an old and
pervasive habit.28 This conflation is rarely more apparent
than in discussions of childhood, where sexuality and
gender are so “intimately entangled” that they can barely be
distinguished.29 In recent years, this tendency has become
an increasingly common feature of anti-LGBT rhetoric: as
the public’s attitudes toward lesbian and gay people have
improved, opponents of LGBT rights have pivoted toward a
focus on protecting children from exposure to “men dressed
as women,” “drag queens,” and “transgender activists.”30 In
light of this trend, it would be both a moral and tactical
failing to mount a normative defense of children’s
homosexuality without offering a parallel defense of
children’s gender-variance.
C. Child
Stockton writes, “[i]f you scratch a child, you will find a
queer, in the sense of someone ‘gay’ or just plain strange.” 31
In law as in life, childhood is a slippery concept: the term
“child” is used loosely to refer to infants, toddlers, and
teenagers, and even a parent’s offspring, who remains the

27. And because the phrase “heterosexual and gender-conformist” is a
mouthful, I have adopted to term “straight” as the opposite of “queer.” Queer
theorists often use the term “heteronormativity” as an alternative to what I am
calling “straightness.” See, e.g., Michael Warner, Introduction to FEAR OF A
QUEER PLANET, supra note 9, at xxi. I prefer “straightness” and “straight,”
because they are more accessible and familiar to most readers.
28. See generally Francisco Valdes, Queers, Dykes, Sissies, and Tomboys:
Deconstructing the Conflation of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in
Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1995) (discussing the
historic and pervasive conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation).
29. See SEDGWICK, supra note 11, at 20.
30. See discussion infra Part III.G.
31. STOCKTON, supra note 17, at 1.
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parent’s “child” for life.32 This Article does not attempt to
navigate or resolve the ambiguities of who is and is not a
“child” by dissecting data on the age of children’s “sexual
awakening,”33 or specifying the moment at which a young
person’s sexual or gender development is complete. In this
Article, the term “child” refers not to a person of any
particular age, but rather to the idea of childhood—the
fiction of the child that is reproduced by adults looking back
upon an imagined past.34 More than just vindicating a
child’s right to “come out” at any particular age,35 it
challenges the premise that children’s queerness is harmful,
immoral, or inferior. If the state has no legitimate interest
in encouraging children’s straightness or discouraging
children’s queerness,36 then the questions of who counts as a
“child” and who counts as “queer” are not especially
relevant. As Stockton observes, the concept of the gay child
illuminates the possibility that in one way or another, “any
and every child” may be queer.37
32. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 239 (6th ed. 1994) (defining “child” and
“children” to include “Progeny; offspring of parentage” and “Unborn or recently
born human being,” and observing that “[a]t common law one who had not
attened the age of fourteen years, though the meaning now varies in different
statutes”). Cf. STOCKTON, supra note 17, at 2 (“What a child ‘is’ is a darkening
question.”); id. at 16 (“The child is even defined as a kind of legal strangeness.”).
33. See, e.g., Gilbert Herdt & Martha McClintock, The Magical Age of 10, in 1
SEXUAL HEALTH 183 (M.S. Tepper & A.F. Owens eds., 2007).
34. See STOCKTON, supra note 17, at 5; LEE EDELMAN, NO FUTURE: QUEER
THEORY AND THE DEATH DRIVE 11 (2004) (describing the “child” as “the repository
of variously sentimentalized cultural identifications”); LAUREN BERLANT, THE
QUEEN OF AMERICA GOES TO WASHINGTON CITY 5 (1997) (arguing that “the most
hopeful national pictures of ‘life’ circulating in the public sphere are not of
adults in everyday life, in public, or in politics, but rather of the most vulnerable
minor or virtual citizens—fetuses, children, real and imaginary immigrants—
persons that, paradoxically, cannot yet act as citizens”).
35. STOCKTON, supra note 17, at 3-4 (“Far from a simple, sentimentalized plea
for children’s rights to come out ‘gay,’ this book scouts the conceptual force of
ghostly gayness in the figure of the child . . . .”).
36. See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275,
1300 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“In our democracy, however, it is
not the province of the State, even if it were able to do so, to dictate or even
attempt to influence how its citizens should develop their sexual and gender
identities.”).
37. STOCKTON, supra note 17, at 2.
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II. HISTORICIZING THE FEAR
Working from David Halperin’s premise that we cannot
dispel these fears until we understand them,38 this Part
offers a brief historiography of the fear of the queer child. It
begins by offering a few examples of the fear’s premodern
origins, which anticipate several aspects of the fear’s
contemporary reincarnations. Next, it describes how the
fear became one of the primary justifications for anti-LGBT
policies in the modern era. In the early twentieth century,
as the modern concepts of childhood and homosexuality
were institutionalized, they were linked together in the new
figure of the homosexual child molester, which became one
of the century’s leading villains. This Part concludes by
explaining that during the same historical period, a new
psychology of childhood set the stage for the emergence of
new fears that children would be initiated into queerness
through indoctrination, role modeling, and public approval,
rather than through sexual relations with predatory adults.
A. Premodern Fears
The concept of homosexuality is scarcely more than one
hundred years old,39 but the fear of the queer child is much
older. In ancient Greece, more than 2000 years ago,
Aristotle worried that if boys were “sexually abused from
childhood,” they could develop a disposition toward “sexual
intercourse with males”—specifically, a disposition to play
the “passive” rather than the “active” role in homosexual
relations, which Aristotle analogized to the role that
“women” played “in marital relations.”40 In the Middle Ages,
38. Halperin, Deviant Teaching, supra note 2, at 166.
39. DAVID M. HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 15 (1990).
40. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 145-46, para. 1148b, ll. 28-30
(Robert C. Bartlett & Susan D. Collins trans., 2011). One of Aristotle’s students
made a more explicit version of this claim in a pseudo-Aristotelian text known
as Problems. See HOMOSEXUALITY IN GREECE AND ROME: A SOURCEBOOK OF
ANCIENT DOCUMENTS 262-64 (Thomas Hubbard ed., 2003) (quoting 5.16 PS.ARISTOTLE, Problems 4.26).
My translation of Nicomachean Ethics is based on my review of several leading
translations, secondary sources, and correspondence with several experts on
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a French poet complained that when noble boys were sent
off to boarding school, they learned the “obscene habits” of
sodomy from teachers—practices in which “men make
women of themselves, and stallions turn into mares.”41 In
the Italian Renaissance, another poet recounted in graphic
detail how he had learned the art of sodomy from his tutor,
and he warned the young men of Florence about the
dangers of associating with older males: “If a pederast once
gets a kid in his clutches,/He knows how to drill the recruit
in his art.”42 In the English Renaissance, a British
ancient Greek language. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 40, at 145-46;
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 127-28 (Roger Crisp trans., 2000); ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 185-86 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985); ARISTOTLE, THE
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 403 (H. Rackham trans., 1934); DAVID COHEN, LAW,
SEXUALITY, AND SOCIETY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS IN CLASSICAL ATHENS
180 (1991); K.J. DOVER, GREEK HOMOSEXUALITY 103 (1978); JOHN J. WINKLER,
THE CONSTRAINTS OF DESIRE: THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF SEX AND GENDER IN ANCIENT
GREECE (1990); Nicomachean Ethics VII. 5-6: Beastliness, Irascibility, and
Akrasia, in ARISTOTLE: NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOK VII SYMPOSIUM
ARISTOTELICUM 103, 110 (Carlo Natali ed., 2009).
41. JAMES WILHELM, GAY AND LESBIAN POETRY: AN ANTHOLOGY FROM SAPPHO
MICHELANGELO 168 (1995) (quoting Walter of Châtillon, Stuli cum
prudentibus currunt ad coronam)

TO

When they are young, sons of the nobility
Are sent away to France to learn scholarship;
Corrupters of youth recruit them with coaxes and cash,
And so they bring their obscene habits back to Artaxata.
These are the practices of barbarians, Romans, and Greeks; . . .
Men make women of themselves, and stallions turn into mares.
Id.
42. Id. at 291 (quoting Pacifico Massimi, Advice
HECATELEGIUM (ONE HUNDRED ELEGIES), at Book I, 9)
The only taint in my morals came from the tutor
That my father and mother unwittingly wished upon me.
He was the king of pederasts; no prey ever
Escaped his hands, since he was a master of that art.
O yes, I learned a lot of things I’d have preferred not to.
I learned about using my mouth—and my asshole. . . .
If a pederast once gets a young kid in his clutches,
He knows how to drill the recruit in his art.
Id.

to

Paulinus,

in
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prosecutor claimed that if a teacher had “prevailed” in his
alleged attempt to have sex with one of his students, “this
lad, now sixteen years old . . . would have infected all
others; and as in course of years they grew big enough, they
would leave the College to go into the world and spread this
cursed poison.”43
These are history’s earliest examples of the fear of the
queer child. By referring to these passages as “examples,”
however, I do not mean to imply that they are
representative of the historical periods in which they were
authored—or, more broadly, that the fear of a queer child
was a pervasive belief in the premodern era. Because of the
limitations of the premodern record, it is not possible to say
whether these early analogues of the fear were
commonplace, or whether they were overrepresented in the
sources that have survived. I set forth these examples to
show only that the fear of a queer child is a remarkably old,
pliable, and enduring thought, which has proved capable of
conforming itself to times and places in which people held
starkly varied ideas about homosexuality and childhood.
Although these fears were articulated in disparate
times and places, they touch upon several themes that
anticipate the fear’s evolution in the modern period.
First, these fears are sexual. They articulate a version
of the seduction fear—the claim that children can be
initiated into queerness by engaging in homosexual activity
with adults. This was the principal version of the fear well
into the modern period; in the United States, it served as
one of the primary justifications for anti-LGBT policies until
the 1980s.
Second, these fears are educational. They are focused on
teachers and teaching, and more generally, the process
through which children are socialized and initiated into
43. THOMAS A. KING, 1 THE GENDERING OF MEN, 1600–1750: THE ENGLISH
PHALLUS 109 (2004) (quoting The Trial of Richard Branson, for an Attempt to
Commit Sodomy, on the Body of James Fassett, One of the Scholars Belonging to
God’s-Gift-College, in Dulwich. Tried at the General Quarter Session of the
Peace, held at St. Margaret’s Hill, in the Borough of Southwark (1760), reprinted
in IAN MCCORMICK, SECRET SEXUALITIES, A SOURCEBOOK OF 17TH AND 18TH
CENTURY WRITINGS 113 (1997)).
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adulthood.44 In this sense, they anticipate the contemporary
fears of indoctrination, role modeling, and public approval,
which claim that teachers, parents, and the state can teach
children to be queer.
Third, these fears are universalizing. Although they
deal with men teaching boys to engage in homosexual acts,
they do not characterize the men or the boys as
“homosexuals,” or the acts themselves as “homosexual,”
because the modern concept of homosexuality had not been
developed yet.45 Rather than positing that these acts were
practiced by a “small, distinct, relatively fixed” minority of
homosexual persons, the authors presumed that
homosexual habits could be passed on from one generation
to the next.46

44. Halperin, Deviant Teaching, supra note 2, at 149-50.
45. HALPERIN, supra note 39, at 15.
46. This is not to say, however, that the authors would not have
characterized the men or the boys by reference to any sexual identities—just not
to the identity of the “homosexual.” For example, classicists agree that Aristotle
was most likely claiming that if a boy were sexually abused during childhood, he
was likely to become a kinaidos—a man who enjoyed playing the passive role in
sexual relations with other males. See, e.g., WINKLER, supra note 40, at 69;
COHEN, supra note 40, at 180. Similarly, Walter of Chatillon may have
characterized the men and the boys in his poem as “sodomites,” WILHELM, supra
note 41, at 168, and Massimi clearly refers to his former tutor as “a pederast,”
id. at 291. Several scholars have argued that the modern “homosexual” has
ancestors in the kinaidos, the sodomite, and the pederast, just as modern
homophobia has roots in the stigmas that have historically attached to various
kinds of homosexual behavior. See, e.g., BYRNE FONE, HOMOPHOBIA: A HISTORY
43 (2001); MAUD W. GLEASON, MAKING MEN: SOPHISTS AND SELF-PRESENTATION IN
ANCIENT ROME 64 (1995); DAVID HALPERIN, HOW TO DO THE HISTORY OF
HOMOSEXUALITY 32-38
(2002)
[hereinafter
HALPERIN, HISTORY OF
HOMOSEXUALITY]; MARK D. JORDAN, RECRUITING YOUNG LOVE: HOW CHRISTIANS
TALK ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 163-64 (2011); CRAIG WILLIAMS, ROMAN
HOMOSEXUALITY: IDEOLOGIES OF MASCULINITY IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY 210-11
(1999); WINKLER, supra note 40, at 45-46. In light of these links, it seems
plausible to infer modern fears about boys being seduced into the “homosexual
lifestyle” are socially and culturally linked to premodern fears about boys being
instilled with the habits of the kinaidos, the sodomite, and the pederast. As both
Sedgwick and Eskridge have argued, new models of homosexual identity often
coexist alongside older models. See SEDGWICK, supra note 11, at 47; Eskridge,
supra note 5, at 1331, 1338.
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Fourth, these fears are gender-transitive. Just as
Aristotle worried about boys learning to perform the
woman’s role in sexual relations,47 the medieval French poet
objected to “men” making “women” of themselves and
“stallions” be turned into “mares.”48 Far from distinguishing
between sexuality and gender, the authors presumed that
an individual’s performance of sexuality and gender both
reflected and reinforced one another.49
Finally, these fears are gender-specific. All of these
examples involve men and boys, and some specifically
involve boys playing a passive or “effeminate” role in sexual
relations.50 Around the late nineteenth century, new fears of
47. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 40, at 145-46. In ancient Greece, the figure of
the kinaidos was widely reviled for this effeminate trait, much like the passive
“sodomite” and the “homosexual” would be in later centuries. WINKLER, supra
note 40, 45-54. In another text, Aristotle conflates passivity and effeminacy
more explicitly in terms that are all-too familiar to modern readers: “The signs
of the kinaidos are an unsteady eye and knock-knees; he inclines his head to the
right; he gestures with his palms up and his wrists loose; and he has two styles
of walking—either waggling his hips or keeping them under control.” Id. at 67
(quoting ARISTOTLE, PHYSIOGNOMINICS, 808 12-6).
48. WILHELM, supra note 41, at 168.
49. See HALPERIN, supra note 39, at 15 (“Before 1892 there was no
homosexuality, only sexual inversion. . . . ‘Sexual inversion’ referred to a broad
range of deviant gender behavior, of which homosexual desire was only a logical
but indistinct aspect . . . .”) (quoting George Chauncey, Jr., From Sexual
Inversion to Homosexuality: Medicine and the Changing Conceptualization of
Female Deviance, 58 SALMAGUNDI 114, 116 (1982)). See generally Valdes, supra
note 28 (arguing that the conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation was a
pervasive feature of premodern thought in Europe and the United States).
50. See Halperin, Deviant Teaching, supra note 2, at 151, 154-55 (arguing
that fears about teaching, pederasty, and sodomy are specifically focused on “the
male education of boys” and “the successful reproduction and transmission of
masculinity across the generations”).
My review of the historical literature on female homosexuality did not reveal
any premodern examples of the fear of the queer child involving women and
girls. See, e.g., LEILA J. RUPP, SAPPHISTRIES: A GLOBAL HISTORY OF LOVE
BETWEEN WOMEN (2009); ELIZABETH SUSAN WAHL, INVISIBLE RELATIONS:
REPRESENTATIONS OF FEMALE INTIMACY IN THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT (1999);
BERNADETTE J. BROOTEN, LOVE BETWEEN WOMEN: EARLY CHRISTIAN RESPONSES
TO FEMALE HOMOEROTICISM (1998); LILLIAN FADERMAN, SURPASSING THE LOVE OF
MEN: ROMANTIC FRIENDSHIP AND LOVE BETWEEN WOMEN FROM THE RENAISSANCE
TO THE PRESENT (1981). This impression is confirmed by historians of this period.
See, e.g., HALPERIN, HISTORY OF HOMOSEXUALITY, supra note 46, at 76
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women seducing girls began to appear alongside much older
fears about men and boys.51 But even during the twentieth
century, the fear of seduction was brought to bear most
frequently and forcefully upon men and boys.52
Looking back on these premodern examples, it may be
tempting to interpret them as objections to pederasty—that
is, to the practice of adults having sex with children—rather
than fears about the transmission of queerness among
males. But even putting aside the practice of paederastia in
ancient Greece,53 it would be anachronistic to view the early
(“Certainly, being seduced by a tribade does not make you a tribade yourself.”);
BROOTEN, supra note 50, at 361 (1998) (“In contrast to their presentations of
male homoeroticism, the sources practically never accuse homoerotic women of
sex with children . . . .”).
The absence of fears about women seducing girls into queerness is likely
explained by the convergence of the following gender norms, among others: (1)
The norm that males are more sexually aggressive than females; (2) the norm
that defines sexual activity as penetration by the phallus; and (3) the norm that
heterosexual males often pursue younger females, which effectively pushes the
back the cultural boundary between women and girls. Each of these norms were
likely more prevalent in the premodern period, and they would explain why the
fear of seduction was not often articulated in ways that included the possibility
of women seducing girls.
51. See, e.g., HAVELOCK ELLIS, SEXUAL INVERSION 129 (F. A. Davis Co. 1901)
(1897) (claiming that one of the most important exciting causes of sexual
inversion was “seduction,” which he defined as “the initiation of a young boy or
girl by some older and more experienced person in whom inversion is already
developed, and who is seeking the gratification of the abnormal instinct”)
(emphasis added); RUPERT CROFT-COOKE, BOSIE: THE STORY OF LORD ALFRED
DOUGLAS, HIS FRIENDS AND ENEMIES 132 (1963) (quoting letter from June 28,
1895 in which Douglas wrote: “Perhaps you are not aware that ‘Lesbianism’
exists to any extent in London, but I can assure you that it does, and though I of
course cannot mention names, I could point out to you half a dozen women in
society or among actresses who would be considered as ‘dangerous’ to young
girls as Oscar Wilde will I suppose henceforth be considered to boys.”); see also
LISA DUGGAN, SAPPHIC SLASHERS: SEX, VIOLENCE, AND AMERICAN MODERNITY 174
(2000) (quoting James Kiernan, Responsibility in Sexual Perversion, 20
UROLOGIC & CUTANEOUS REV. 44, 47 (Jan. 1916) (arguing that women who were
“deeply ingrained sex inverts . . . see no harm in [the] seduction of young girls.”)
(emphasis added)).
52. See PHILLIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS
MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 62 (1998).

OF THE

CHILD

53. Classical scholars agree that male pederasty was both permitted and
practiced in ancient Greece. ANDREW LEAR & EVA CANTARELLA, IMAGES OF
ANCIENT GREEK PEDERASTY: BOYS WERE THEIR GODS, at xv (2008). In this
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sources only as protests against intergenerational sex. As
Philippe Ariès famously observed in Centuries of Childhood,
premodern societies did not conceptualize childhood as a
distinct period of sexual innocence or weakness.54 Among
other things, Ariès notes that “[t]he practice of playing with
children’s privy parts formed part of a widespread tradition”
in medieval societies, along with the even more widespread
tradition of exposing children to “the sexual ribaldries of
adults.”55 Looking back at the texts of this period, he
explains: “The modern reader . . . is astonished by the
liberties which people took with children, by the coarseness
custom, adult male citizens engaged in courtship rituals and sexual relations
with teenage boys, as a method of educating and mentoring them into
citizenship and adulthood. Once the younger male reached adulthood—an
occasion marked by the growth of a beard—the relationship ended. After a few
years of adulthood, the young man was permitted to take on a lover himself. Id.
at 2-6.
In other words, the tradition of ancient Greek pederasty involved men training
boys in the art of homosexual relations (among other things), and it clearly
contemplated boys carrying this custom into adulthood. Yet given that ancient
Greeks often praised this tradition in effusive terms, it would be wildly
anachronistic to interpret the tradition itself as an example of the fear of
children’s queerness. In Plato’s Symposium, for example, Phaedrus muses, “I
know not any greater blessing to a young man who is beginning life than a
virtuous lover, or to a lover than a beloved youth,” and Aristophanes extols boys
who “hang about men and embrace them” as “the best of boys and youths
because they have the most manly nature.” Even Pausanias, who was more
wary of such relationships, conceded that “he who gives himself to a lover
because he is a good man, and in the hope that he will be improved by his
company, shows himself to be virtuous,” because “this is that love which is the
love of the heavenly goddess, and is heavenly, and of great price to individuals
and cities.” See PLATO, SYMPOSIUM 20 [178b-179b], 26 [184c-185c], 32 [191a192a] (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1956). In more ways than one, such praise is a
far cry from Anita Bryant’s campaign against “homosexual recruitment,” in
which she analogized homosexuals to “prostitutes, thieves, or murderers.”
Morton Kondracke, Anita Bryant Is Mad About Gays, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May
7, 1977, at 14.
54. PHILLPE ARIÈS, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY
LIFE 100-06 (Robert Baldick trans., 1962). Indeed, Ariès went so far as to claim
that the medieval period lacked any “awareness of the particular nature of
childhood . . . which distinguishes the child from the adult, even the young
adult,” and thus, that “[i]n medieval society the idea of childhood did not exist.”
Id. at 128. While this broader claim has been subject to criticism, my historical
analysis does not depend upon it.
55. Id. at 103.
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of the jokes they made, and by the indecency of gestures
made in public.”56
Rather than objecting to seduction as a violation of
children’s innocence or weakness, these premodern authors
were more likely to conceptualize the fear of homosexual
seduction as a special case of a general phenomenon—the
spread of sodomy—which was understood to afflict
individuals of all ages. During the medieval period, for
example, the sin of sodomy was commonly portrayed
through metaphors of “plague, infestation, and disease,”57—
as a form of contagion that could easily “spread from one
person to another.”58
B. The Modern Rise
In a provocative essay titled Deviant Teaching, David
Halperin claims that the modern fear of the homosexual
child molester arises out of society’s long-standing anxieties
about the role of men—in particular, male teachers—
56. Id. at 100.
57. FONE, supra note 46, at 187; JORDAN, supra note 46, at 7, 82, 111, 122,
134, 165.
58. JOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY:
GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO
THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 316 n.52 (1980) (quoting ALBERTUS MAGNUS, IN
EVANGELIUM LUCAE). During the same historical period, sodomy came to be
known as an “unspeakable” vice during this period, a sin that should not be
named. JORDAN, supra note 46, at 92-93, 106, 111, 133, 150-51. As Mark Jordan
has explained, the purpose of this silence was to prevent priests from suggesting
“sins that the penitent might not otherwise have imagined.” Id. at 93.
This tradition of refusing to name sodomy survived well into the modern era. In
William Blackstone’s Commentaries, the jurist defined sodomy as “peccatum
illud horribile, inter christianos non nominandum”—the horrible crime not fit to
be named among Christians. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *345. In
the United States, most states continued to define sodomy in vague terms until
the 1940s and 1950s—most commonly as “the crime against nature.”
Although the non nominandum rule was not specifically designed to protect
children from queerness, it was broadly intended to prevent people from
learning queerness from one another. In this sense, it is one of the earliest
antecedents for the contemporary fears that children will be initiated into
queerness through the non-sexual mechanisms of indoctrination, role modeling,
and public approval.
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initiating boys into manhood.59 He speculates that these
anxieties began to focus specifically on the possibility of
men having sex with boys around the turn of the century—
alongside the invention of the modern concepts of the
“homosexual” and the “heterosexual.”60
Halperin’s claim seems incontrovertible, as far as it
goes: by definition, society couldn’t imagine the homosexual
child molester unless and until it developed the concept of
the “homosexual.” But as this Section explains, Halperin’s
account can be bolstered by the addition of another telling
detail—the convergence of the histories of homosexuality
and childhood in the modern era. Although this coincidence
has hardly been explored by historians,61 the birth of
modern “homosexual” seems to coincide roughly with the
birth of the modern “child,” at least insofar as the concepts
were institutionalized and popularized in the United States.
Around the turn of the century, just as the concept of
homosexuality emerged as a new identity, the concept of
childhood emerged as a new stage of development: the
sodomite was reimagined as the homosexual, and the child
was reimagined as a becoming, rather than a being—a notyet formed individual, who no longer belonged among the

59. Halperin, Deviant Teaching, supra note 2, at 154 (“The initiation of boys
into manhood by men is a traditional source of anxiety. . . . It is in this context
that the possibility of corruption whether moral or sexual—the possibility of
‘sodomy,’ in other words—comes to represent a perennial threat . . . .”).
60. Id. at 155 (“I’ll go on to speculate that such anxieties about deviant
teaching come to single out the issue of sex and to focus obsessively on it in
particular when the initiation of boys into manhood takes place within a
specifically heterosexual and heteronormative society.”).
61. But cf. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS 40 (2008)
[hereinafter ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS] (“At the same time that
Americans were growing obsessively concerned about protecting children from
sexual abuse, they constructed the image of the (male) homosexual as a
predator victimizing their sons and daughters.”); THOMAS L. LAQUEUR, SOLITARY
SEX: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF MASTURBATION 254-67 (2003) (analyzing the
hypotheses that “the rise of concern about masturbation was an aspect of the
rise of concern about homosexuality,” and that “masturbation became a problem
because new boundaries for heterosexuality had to be secured”); MICHAEL
FOUCAULT, 1 HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 43 (1978) (“The nineteenth-century
homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood . . . .”).
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world of adults.62 Above all, childhood was conceptualized as
a period of sexual becoming—not only a time of
vulnerability, impressionability, and innocence, but a time
that presented the risks of hypersexuality, pansexuality,
and the development of other vices that were commonly
associated with sexual excess.63
By the late 1800s, a new vision of childhood had begun
to take root in the United States. Until this period, the age
of consent for sexual intercourse had been only ten years in
most jurisdictions,64 and there had not been any laws
specifically targeting sexual offenses against minors.65 By
1895, most jurisdictions had increased the age of consent to
between fourteen and eighteen years,66 and states began
62. Compare STOCKTON, supra note 17, at 37 (noting that “[m]easures aimed
at safeguarding children were one of the earmarks” of the early twentiethcentury United States, with Eskridge, supra note 61, at 40 (noting the medical
concept of the “homosexual” entered popular discourse in the early twentiethcentury United States). In Solitary Sex, historian Thomas Laqueur resists the
hypotheses that “the rise of concern about masturbation was an aspect of the
rise of concern about homosexuality” and that “masturbation became a problem
because new boundaries for heterosexuality had to be secured.” LAQUEUR, supra
note 61, at 267. In response to such claims, he observes that “the solitary vice
was associated . . . not only with sodomy but with every other sort of sexual and
moral deviance as well.” Id. He acknowledges, however, that “[t]his does not
mean that the histories of homosexuality and nonanism are not linked,” insofar
as they both “became newly exigent as the old constraints on sexuality
crumbled.” Id.
63. Writing of “the history of juvenile courts,” Stockton makes a parallel
observation about the emergence of the modern concept of childhood in the
United States:
[E]vidently, we are scared of the child we would protect. . . . Just as
children are deemed more vulnerable by their guardians in the 1900s
(and thus are deemed more in need of protections, many in the form of
laws), they are constructed as more problematic, as presenting adults
with more and newer problems, even dangers to face. . . . This is a story
about . . . the creation a new kind of child: a ‘delinquent,’ a pre-criminal
person, who must be protected from his own propensities and from the
environment that could set them off.
STOCKTON, supra note 17, at 16, 37.
64. JENKINS, supra note 52, at 24.
65. ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 61, at 3-4; JENKINS, supra
note 52, at 23.
66. JENKINS, supra note 52, at 24.
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passing laws to protect children from the newly recognized
offense of taking “immoral, improper, or indecent liberties”67
with a minor.
In 1883, the new sensibility of this era was aptly
conveyed by the Reverend J.M. Buckley, the vice president
of Anthony Comstock’s New York Society for the Prevention
of Vice. In his introduction to Comstock’s manifesto Traps
for the Young, Buckley warned that society must not only
protect children from predatory adults, but protect itself
from the possibility that children will grow up to be
predators: “Every new generation of youth is sent out into
the world as sheep in the midst of wolves. The danger,
however, is not that they will be devoured by them, but that
they will be transformed into wolves.”68
During this period, the histories of homosexuality and
childhood overlapped in remarkable ways. In 1892, the term
“homosexuality” was introduced into the English language
by Dr. Charles Chaddock;69 only two years later, the same
physician introduced Americans to the newly recognized
problem of child sexual abuse.70 In his 1894 essay Sexual
Crimes, Chaddock made the astounding claim that the
“rape of children is the most common form of sexual crime,”
accounting for an estimated 80% of all reported rapes.71 In
addition, he used the term “pederasty” to refer to the act of

67. ESKRIDGE, DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 61, at 54-55.
68. Id. at 29 (citing J.M. Buckley, Introduction to ANTHONY COMSTOCK, TRAPS
YOUNG, at vi (1883)). Buckley may well have been thinking of boys
growing up to be pederasts. As historian George Chauncey observes, the term
“wolf” was often used as a slang for “active pederast” in New York City during
this historical period. See GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN
CULTURE, AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY MALE WORLD, 1890–1940, at 88 (1994). In
any event, Buckley was surely not thinking of “homosexuals” in the modern
sense of that word. The term “homosexuality” did not enter the English
language until 1892, and it did not enter popular usage until decades later. See
HALPERIN, supra note 39, at 15.
FOR THE

69. HALPERIN, supra note 39, at 15.
70. See JENKINS, supra note 52, at 28 (quoting Charles G. Chaddock, Sexual
Crimes, in 2 A SYSTEM OF LEGAL MEDICINE 547 (Allan McLane Hamilton &
Lawrence Godkin eds., 1894)).
71. Id.
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intercourse involving two males of any age,72 reflecting the
long-standing tendency to conflate the concepts of
homosexuality and sodomy with man-boy relations.73
As the concept of “sexual inversion” began to take shape
in early sexology texts,74 the fear of seduction played a
prominent role in the discipline’s hunt for homosexuality’s
origins. In 1901, sexologist Havelock Ellis published Sexual
Inversion,75 the first United States edition of a popular
medical textbook devoted to the subject.76 Although Ellis
argued that sexual inversion was “based on congenital
conditions,”77 he conceded that it was only “a
predisposition . . . to experience sexual attraction to the
same sex”—a tendency that could “remain latent and
unroused” unless it were “triggered” by an “exciting cause.”78
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1675) (defining
“pederasty” as “Buggery” and “pederast” as “Sodomite”). See generally OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 372 (1st ed. 1961) (1933) (defining “pederasty” as
“[u]nnatural relations with a boy; sodomy” and “pederast” as “sodomite,” based
on pattern of usage in seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries). One
of history’s most famous examples of this conflation is Jeremy Bentham’s essay
On Paederasty, which offered a defense of consensual sexual relations among
adult males. Although Bentham originally authored this essay in 1785, it was
not published until 1978. See Louis Crompton, 3 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 389 (1978);
Louis Crompton, 4 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 91 (1978).
74. Early sexologists constructed “homosexuality” as one symptom of a
broader disorder known as “sexual inversion,” which included a broad range of
gender variant behavior that was diagnosed in both males and females.
Chauncey, supra note 49, at 116. Under this paradigm, male “inverts” were
often described as “a feminine brain in a male body,” and vice-versa. See, e.g.,
RICHARD VON KRAFFT-EBBING, PSYCHOPATHIA SEXUALIS: A MEDICO-FORENSIC
STUDY 226 (Franklin S. Klaf trans., 1965) (1898). Cross-dressing was considered
to be characteristic of sexual inverts, and case histories often emphasized the
significance of gender-variant behavior in childhood. In 1883, for example, one
physician observed that his patient “was peculiar in girlhood, in that she
preferred masculine sports and labor; had an aversion to attentions from young
men and sought the society of her own sex.” Chauncey, supra note 49, at 119-20.
75. ELLIS, supra note 51.
76. DUGGAN, supra note 51, at 27.
77. See ELLIS, supra note 51, at 181; see also KRAFFT-EBBING, supra note 74,
at 285.
78. ELLIS, supra note 51, at 190.
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Echoing a theme that was already centuries old, Ellis
claimed that an early incident of “seduction” during
childhood was among the most “important exciting causes”
of sexual inversion.79 Rendering this ancient fear in
distinctly modern terms, he explained:
By this I mean the initiation of a young boy or girl by some older
and more experienced person in whom inversion is already
developed, and who is seeking the gratification of the abnormal
instinct. This appears to be a not uncommon incident in the early
80
history of sexual inverts.

Recalling long-standing anxieties about teachers and
schools, Ellis claimed that “a large number” of sexual
inverts “date the development of homosexuality from the
influences and examples of school life.”81
By the late 1930s, the new concepts of homosexuality
and childhood had been widely popularized and
institutionalized in the United States, and the image of the
homosexual child molester emerged as one of society’s most
sinister figures.82 In 1939, two British criminologists
articulated one of the first thoroughly modern examples of
the fear—the claim that exposing children to “homosexuals”
would make them more likely to become “homosexual.”83
79. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
80. ELLIS, supra note 51, at 190. Because Ellis is operating within the new
framework of sexual inversion, which applies to both males and females, he
depicts the scene of seduction in gender-neutral terms: A young “boy or girl” is
seduced by an older and more experienced “person” in whom inversion is
already developed. Id. To the best of my knowledge, this passage is the earliest
example in which the fear of the queer child was articulated in gender-neutral
terms. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
81. Id. In a similar vein, Ellis observed that many inverts traced the
emergence of homosexuality back to “the segregation of boys and girls apart
from each other during the important periods of puberty and adolescence.” Id.
82. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID
CLOSET 37-43 (2000) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW]; ESKRIDGE,
DISHONORABLE PASSIONS, supra note 61, at 40; Estelle B. Freedman,
“Uncontrolled Desires”: The Response to the Sexual Psychopath, 1920–1960, 74 J.
AMER. HIST. 83, 89, 100, 102 (1987).
OF THE

83. W. NORWOOD EAST & W.H. DE B. HUBERT, REPORT ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
TREATMENT OF CRIME (1939), reprinted in SEXOLOGY UNCENSORED, THE
DOCUMENTS OF SEXUAL SCIENCE 70 (Lucy Bland & Laura L. Doan eds., 1998).
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Reporting on a survey of more than 4000 adolescents, the
authors wrote: “Seduction in early youth or childhood was
the commonest single environmental factor found in the
series investigated.” 84 Taking aim at the congenital theories
of early sexologists, they continued: “This sequence of
events appeared most important in the causation of
homosexuality, and is probably far more likely an
explanation than one which depends upon the assumption
that there is commonly some specific glandular influence
acting in a feminine direction in these cases.”85 Emphasizing
the predatory nature of male homosexuals, they warned
that “[a]ttractive and good-looking boys and young men
would be predisposed to the development of homosexuality
because they would be more likely to be the focus of
attention of homosexuals.”86 Several years later, after a
wave of children’s murders, these findings were republished
in a leading American psychiatry journal and invoked to
justify the adoption of new laws targeting sexual
psychopaths.87
In the 1950s, the fear of seduction was invoked by
federal, state, and local governments to justify a campaign
to purge homosexuals from civil service and public schools.88
In legislative reports, politicians often claimed that
homosexuals sought to seduce children into homosexual
encounters.89 In 1950, for example, Senator Clyde Hoey’s
Committee Report recommended that “homosexuals and
other sex perverts” be banned from federal employment on
the grounds that “perverts will frequently attempt to entice
normal individuals to engage in perverted practices,”
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Freedman, supra note 82, at 104 (citing Norwood W. East, Sexual
Offenders, 103 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASES 648-49 (1946)). As historians
Estelle Freedman and George Chauncey have noted, the image of the
homosexual child molester emerged in response to two waves of children’s
murders in the late 1930s and 1940s. Id. at 103-105; CHAUNCEY, supra note 68,
at 359-60.
88. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 82, at 100-104.
89. Id.
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emphasizing that “[t]his is particularly true of young and
impressionable people that might come under the influence
of a sex pervert.”90
The most elaborate example of this new legal argument
was articulated by the Johns Committee of the Florida
State Legislature, which launched a campaign to rid the
state’s public schools of homosexual teachers in 1958. At the
end of a six-year investigation, the committee described the
threat of homosexuality in terms that would be closely
echoed by Anita Bryant’s Save Our Children campaign,
fifteen years later: “[A] great many homosexuals have an
insatiable appetite for sexual activities and find special
gratification in the recruitment to their ranks of youth.”91 In
a remarkable move, the Johns Committee even claimed that
the creation of new homosexuals was the motive of
homosexual predators: “The homosexual prefers to reach
out for the child at the time of normal sexual awakening
and to conduct a psychological preliminary to the physical
contact. The homosexual’s goal and part of the satisfaction
is to ‘bring over’ the young person, to hook him for
homosexuality.”92 With melodramatic flair, the Committee
claimed that the strategy of seduction effectively allowed
homosexuals to reproduce as a species, by breeding a new
generation of homosexual predators: “[H]omosexuality is
unique among the sexual assaults considered by our laws in
that the person affected by the practicing homosexual is
first a victim, then an accomplice, and finally himself a
perpetrator of homosexual acts.”93

90. DAVID K. JOHNSON, THE LAVENDER SCARE: THE COLD WAR PERSECUTION OF
GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 101-18 (2004) (quoting
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Expenditures in the Exec.
Dep’ts, Interim Report: Employment of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in
Government (1950)).
91. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 82, at 84 (quoting Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm., Homosexuality and Citizenship in Florida (Tallahassee,
Jan. 1964) in Johns Papers, Box 1, Folder 21).
92. Id.
93. Id.
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C. Seduction’s Successors
In addition to stoking the fear of seduction, early
psychologists introduced more nuanced theories about
homosexuality’s origins that set the stage for the emergence
of subtler versions of the fear in coming years. In the early
twentieth century, the revolutionary work of Sigmund
Freud served as a catalyst for reconceptualizing children’s
sexual and gender development. Freud’s introduction of the
theory of the unconscious, which posited the pervasive
influence of sexual thoughts in the individual’s construction
of self,94 opened the door for a century of both professional
and amateur speculations about hidden fantasies, fetishes,
and perversions within children’s psyches. But Freud’s most
significant contributions to the evolution of the fear were
ones that he could hardly have anticipated, because they
were popularized by successors who attacked the basic
premises of his work.
In his famous Three Essays, Freud introduced his
Oedipal model of child sexual development, which
represented a radical departure from the congenital
theories of homosexuality offered by early sexologists.95 One
of the foundational assumptions of Freud’s model was that
“in every normal male or female individual, traces are found
of the opposite sex”96—a claim that he later described as
“the universal bisexuality of human beings.”97 Although
Freud’s views on homosexuality were notoriously
ambivalent, he clearly believed that a child’s sexual
orientation was determined by nurture, rather than
nature—in particular, by the child’s relationship with his
parents. In a famous letter to one patient’s mother, he wrote
94. SIGMUND FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY (1905),
reprinted in 7 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS
OF SIGMUND FREUD 133-34 (James Strachey trans. & ed., The Hogarth Press Ltd.
1953).
95. Id. at 141.
96. Id.
97. SIGMUND FREUD, THE PSYCHOGENESIS OF A CASE OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN A
WOMAN (1920), reprinted in 18 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 157 (James Strachey trans. & ed.,
The Hogarth Press Ltd. 1955) [hereinafter FREUD, THE PSYCHOGENESIS].
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that homosexuality was “produced by a certain arrest of
sexual development,” but he insisted that “it is nothing to be
ashamed of, no vice, no degradation,” and “it cannot be
classified as an illness.”98 As for the prospect of “curing”
homosexuals, he was skeptical: “In general, to undertake to
convert a fully developed homosexual into a heterosexual
does not offer much more prospect of success than the
reverse.”99
By the late 1930s, Freud’s work had already
transformed the theory and practice of psychology in the
United States. Yet shortly after Freud’s death in 1939, a
group of American psychoanalysts successfully challenged
his views on the etiology of homosexuality and the
treatment of homosexuals.100 Sandor Rado argued that
heterosexuality, rather than bisexuality, was an innate
characteristic of all human beings and that homosexuality
was an unnatural condition triggered by poor parenting. 101
Picking up on this theme, Irving Bieber and Charles
Socarides developed the popular model that male
homosexuality developed when boys were raised by mothers
who were “close-binding,” “domineering, harsh, and phallic”
and fathers who were “detached,” “absent,” and “weak.”102
This family dynamic, they believed, caused a boy to identify
with his mother instead of his father and develop feminine
rather than masculine traits—including a sexual attraction
to other males.103
During the postwar period, the new model of
homosexuality introduced by Rado, Bieber, and Socarides
was widely embraced by mainstream psychologists. In 1952,
98. Letter from Sigmund Freud to Anonymous Mother (Apr. 9, 1935),
reprinted in A Letter from Freud, 107 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 786, 786-87 (1951).
99. FREUD, THE PSYCHOGENESIS, supra note 97, at 145.
100. KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT
(2006).
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101. SANDOR RADO, ADAPTATIONAL PSYCHODYNAMICS: MOTIVATION AND CONTROL
212 (1969).
102. CHARLES W. SOCARIDES, HOMOSEXUALITY 183-84 (1978); IRVING BIEBER
79-81 (1975).
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the
American
Psychiatric
Association
categorized
homosexuality as a “sociopathic personality disorder” in the
first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, the organization’s definitive index of
psychiatric diseases.104 Armed with this diagnosis, postwar
therapists often sought to “convert” male patients to
heterosexuality by instilling them with masculinity, in an
attempt to “cure” them of maternal influences and
effeminate characteristics.105 Much like the model of sexual
inversion propounded by early sexologists, conversion
therapists held that inadequate gender socialization—
specifically, too much mothering and not enough
fathering—often caused boys to develop homosexual desires,
engage in homosexual acts, and identify as gay or
bisexual.106 This model set the stage for the 1970s and
1980s, when fears of indoctrination and role modeling began
to displace fears of seduction as the rallying cry for
opponents of LGBT rights.
III. CONTEMPORARY REINCARNATIONS
This Part links the old with the new. By tracing the
emergence of the fear’s contemporary reincarnations, it
explains how opponents have nearly managed to dictate the
normative parameters of legal and political debates about
LGBT rights for the last fifty years. Building upon William
Eskridge’s influential No Promo Homo model of anti-gay
discourse, it examines the fears of indoctrination, role
104. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC
DISORDERS 38-39 (1952).

AND

STATISTICAL MANUAL: MENTAL

105. YOSHINO, supra note 100, at 38-39.
106. Although some psychologists proposed similar theories about female
homosexual development in this era, none gained widespread acceptance among
mainstream psychologists. See, e.g., SOCARIDES, supra note 102, at 188 (claiming
that lesbianism derives from a girl’s “dread of . . . a malevolent mother” and her
conviction that her father “rejects and hates her”); see also EDA G. GOLDSTEIN &
LOIS C. HOROWITZ, LESBIAN IDENTITY AND CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOTHERAPY: A
FRAMEWORK FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE 17-19 (2003) (noting that several early
psychoanalysts dissented from Freudian theories of lesbianism and female
sexual development); id. at 23 (noting that lesbianism and female sexual
development were not systematically explored by psychotherapists until the
1970s).
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modeling, and public approval in judicial opinions and
legislative debates since the 1970s. After considering how
each of these fears has influenced legal conflicts over LGBT
rights, this Part concludes by observing a significant new
trend in the fear’s development—the resurgence of fears
about children’s gender-variance during the 1990s and
2000s. In response to the public’s changing attitudes about
lesbian, gay, and bisexual people, opponents of LGBT rights
have pivoted toward the “man in a dress” as the new target
for an old set of fears.
A. Disaggregating No Promo Homo
Social movements often beget backlashes.107 When one
group challenges a discriminatory regime, another group
tries to preserve it. In her work on the feminist and civil
rights movements, Reva Siegel has shown that “[c]ivil rights
agitation plays a significant role in precipitating the
modernization of status regimes.”108 When a new movement
successfully contests one of the regime’s justifications, the
regime’s defenders develop alternatives. Over time, Siegel
explains, the regime’s justifications are “translated from an
older, socially contested idiom into a newer, more socially
acceptable idiom.”109 Instead of simply abolishing a status
regime, civil rights reform “modernizes the rules and
rhetoric through which status relations are enforced and
justified.”110 Siegel dubs this dynamic “preservation through
transformation,”111 or the “modernization” of justifications
for discriminatory regimes.112
In his article No Promo Homo, William Eskridge draws
upon Siegel’s framework to develop a dynamic model of the
107. See generally LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA:
REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS (2003); Jessica Roberts, To Have and To
Uphold: The Common Language of Status-Preserving Countermovements, 21
NAT’L BLACK L.J. 122, 122 (2009).
108. Siegel, supra note 7, at 2179.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2178.
112. Id. at 2184.
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evolution of anti-LGBT rhetoric.113 Following Siegel, he
argues that anti-LGBT discourse was “modernized” in the
1970s, in response to the early progress of the LGBT
movement. Before Stonewall, Eskridge observes, “laws or
social norms stigmatizing gay people were justified on the
ground that gay people do disgusting things or are diseased
or predatory,”114 but “[s]ince the 1960s, these justifications
have been supplemented with arguments that progay
changes in law or norms would encourage homosexuality or
homosexual conduct.”115 Dubbing the new paradigm “No
Promo Homo,”116 Eskridge explains that the first principle of
“The Standard Argument” is that “[i]f the state adopts
policy x ([or] abandons policy y) it would be endorsing and
promoting homosexuality or homosexual behavior.”117 He
explains that “[t]his kind of argument became salient once
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered people started
making some headway in reducing state antigay policies.”118
Eskridge is careful to note that as opponents introduce new
arguments against the recognition of LGBT rights, a
process of “sedimentation” occurs which “allows modern
tropes to mingle with ancient ones.”119 “[T]he old arguments
do not disappear,” he explains, but “remain as foundational
layers over which new arguments intellectually
sediment.”120
The important work of Siegel and Eskridge provides a
vital foundation for understanding how opponents of LGBT
rights have transformed the fear of the queer child in the
years since Stonewall. In Siegel’s terms, opponents
113. Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1346.
114. Id. at 1328-29.
115. Id. at 1329.
116. See Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695,
1702 (1993) (using the phrase “No Promo Homo” to describe the Briggs
Initiative’s new strategy of banning the “‘advocating’ and ‘promoting’ of
homosexuality”).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1338.
120. Id. at 1331.
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“modernized” the fear during the 1970s, in response to the
LGBT movement’s progress. During this period, the age-old
fear of seduction was translated into less stigmatizing, more
acceptable terms. When compared to the old fears, Eskridge
explains, the new fears were “more abstract and less
personal.”121 On the one hand, they posed “less risk of riling
and thereby mobilizing [LGBT] people”122; on the other
hand, they allowed opponents “to attract the support of the
tolerant but anxious middle ground of the American
public.”123
Building upon this framework, this Part makes two
contributions to the understanding of anti-LGBT rhetoric in
the post-Stonewall period. First, it demonstrates that above
all, No Promo Homo campaigns were specifically targeted at
children and childhood—the period of development in which
individuals are thought to be most vulnerable to the
influences of indoctrination, role modeling, and public
approval. By focusing on the impact of policies on children’s
sexual and gender development, opponents sought to
bracket the legal and moral status of LGBT adults, while
making more plausible empirical claims about the
transmission of queerness. Second, this Part shows that by
introducing a set of alternative theories of how children are
initiated into queerness by teachers, parents, and the state,
opponents of LGBT rights effectively multiplied the
empirical foundations for the fear of the queer child. Rather
than relying exclusively on claims of seduction, opponents
invoked new themes of indoctrination, role modeling, and
public approval to establish an over-determined, mutuallyreinforcing network of alternative justifications for antiLGBT policies. These two dimensions of the fear’s
transformation are especially significant, because they
explain much of the fear’s plausibility, prevalence, and
staying power in the contemporary period. When opposition
to LGBT rights is focused on children and justified on a
121. Id. at 1365.
122. Id.
123. Id.; see also Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 414, 460-62, 475-76 (1999) (arguing that rhetoric about deterrence helps
advocates avoid expressing views that are morally and culturally contested).
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handful of shifting, alternative grounds, it becomes more
appealing to a wide audience and more challenging for
LGBT advocates to rebut.
B. The Backlash Begins
The modern LGBT movement is typically dated to the
Stonewall riots of June 29, 1969, when gay and transgender
bar patrons responded to a police raid by resisting arrest,
sparking a series of public protests.124 In the wake of these
demonstrations, the gay liberation movement rapidly
organized and mobilized; within the next decade, the cause
began to make remarkable gains. In 1972, East Lansing,
Michigan passed the country’s first law prohibiting
discrimination based on “affectional or sexual preference.”125
In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association removed the
diagnosis of “homosexuality” from the DSM, indicating that
psychologists should no longer treat homosexuality as a
mental disorder.126 In 1975, the U.S. Civil Service
Commission adopted a policy prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual preference.127 By 1977, sodomy laws had
been repealed in nineteen states and anti-discrimination
ordinances had been adopted in more than forty
municipalities across the United States.128
Rather than repeating the tired tropes of the 1950s,
opponents of LGBT rights began to introduce a series of
refinements to the fear of the queer child. Before Stonewall,
they had emphasized the specter of seduction—adults
initiating children into queerness through sexual activity
between adult and child. After Stonewall, opponents began
to articulate fears about adults influencing children’s sexual
124. Hunter, supra note 116, at 1702; see generally MARTIN DUBERMAN,
STONEWALL (1993) (telling the story of the events surrounding the Stonewall
riots).
125. GREAT EVENTS FROM HISTORY: GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER
EVENTS, 1848–2006, at 228 (Lillian Faderman et al. eds., 2007).
126. DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE STRUGGLE
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 199-217 (1999).

TO BUILD A GAY

127. Id. at 532.
128. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 82, at 328-37, 356-61.
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and gender development through the subtler dynamics of
indoctrination, role modeling, and public approval.
These new justifications for anti-LGBT policies began to
surface in judicial opinions and legislative debates during
the early 1970s.129 In the late 1970s, the new paradigm was
popularized by Anita Bryant’s “Save Our Children”
campaign, which became an enduring template for
opposition to LGBT rights. By the mid-1980s, the old fear of
seduction had been substantially (though never completely)
displaced by the new fears of indoctrination, role modeling,
and public approval, which then became the primary
justifications for anti-LGBT policies in the post-Stonewall
era. The new fears were most often invoked in debates over
parenting and education policies, but they surfaced in
debates over a broad range of anti-LGBT policies.
More than anything else, the differences among the
fears of seduction, indoctrination, role modeling, and public
approval turn on subtle variations in the ways that
opponents have imagined the process of children becoming
queer—variations that attribute principal agency to adults,
children, and the state itself. Like the seduction fear, the
indoctrination fear imagines LGBT parents and teachers
playing the lead role by actively recruiting children into
queerness. By comparison, the rhetoric of role modeling
downplays the agency of adults; it imagines children
playing a more active role in the spread of queerness by
“learning” from, “identifying” with, and “imitating” LGBT
parents and teachers. Ironically, although the rhetoric of
role modeling seems less stigmatizing than accusations of
indoctrination and recruitment, it allows opponents to
criticize a much broader spectrum of LGBT life, including
many of life’s most private and banal moments—a parent
living with a same-sex partner, displaying same-sex
affections, wearing a commitment ring, or coming out to a
child.

129. See, e.g., Acanfora v. Bd. of Ed. of Montgomery Cnty., 359 F. Supp. 843
(D. Md. 1973) (holding that a teacher is protected from being fired after his
school finds out he is homosexual, but that same teacher is not protected if they
make public appearances that rouse controversy).
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The discourse of public approval takes this logic one
step further by removing LGBT adults from the process
through which queerness is transmitted. In this rhetoric, it
is primarily the government that indoctrinates children into
queerness, rather than any particular LGBT parent or
teacher. In effect, the state serves as the child’s “role
model,” sending the message to children that queerness and
straightness are equivalent to straightness. In the
legislative hearings on the Defense of Marriage Act, one
rabbi aptly summarized his belief in the state’s ability to
socialize children into heterosexual or homosexual
relationships: “As many parents and teachers instinctively
recognize . . . the laws by which a society chooses to govern
itself have (among other things) an educational function.”130
C. Indoctrination
Even as early as the 1950s and 1960s, terms like
“indoctrination,” “recruitment,” and “proselytizing” had
been used as euphemisms for soliciting and seducing
minors.131 In the early 1970s, however, these terms gained a
more specific referent—the new activism of the gay
liberation movement. This novel threat of homosexual
recruitment was highlighted by Gay Lib v. Univ of Missouri,

130. See The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 51, 53 (1996) (statement of David Zwiebel).
131. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 64, at 84 (“Homosexuals have an
insatiable appetite for sexual activities and find special gratification in the
recruitment to their ranks of youth”) (quoting Florida Legislative Investigation
Comm., Homosexuality and Citizenship in Florida (Tallahassee, Jan. 1964) in
Johns Papers, Box 1, Folder 21) (emphasis added); KEN WORTHY, THE NEW
HOMOSEXUAL REVOLUTION (1965) (“[I]f it is no longer a crime, there will be no
deterrent at all to preventing the constant recruitment to its ranks of young
men and women.”); HERVEY MILTON CLECKLEY, THE CARICATURE OF LOVE: A
DISCUSSION OF SOCIAL, PSYCHIATRIC, AND LITERARY MANIFESTATIONS OF
PATHOLOGIC SEXUALITY 20, 29 (1957) (stating his “strong opinion that in
homosexuals a tendency to seduce and indoctrinate is very common, and hence
real and dangerous”).
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a federal case that resulted in three published opinions
during the late 1970s.132
Shortly after Stonewall, gay students across the country
began forming organizations on college campuses.133 In
1971, a small group calling itself Gay Lib applied for formal
recognition as a student organization at the University of
Missouri.134 In the group’s mission statement, the students
expressed the intentions to “provide a dialogue between the
homosexual and heterosexual members of the university
community,”135 “dispel the lack of information and develop
an understanding of the homosexual,”136 and “alleviate the
unnecessary burden of shame felt by the local homosexual
population.”137 Anticipating the University’s objections, the
students stressed that “Gay Lib does not seek to proselytize,
convert, or recruit,”138 and that “[a]s an educational group,
Gay Lib does not advocate any violation of state statutes,”139
including the state’s sodomy law.
The University was not satisfied by Gay Lib’s
assurances. Denying the group’s request, the University
reasoned that “[t]here are potential or latent homosexuals,
i.e. persons who come into adolescence or young adulthood
unaware that they have homosexual tendencies,”140 and that
“[w]hat happens to a latent or potential homosexual from
the standpoint of his environment can cause him to become
or not to become a homosexual.”141 If Gay Lib were formally
recognized, the University warned, such recognition would:
“(1) . . . tend to reinforce the personal identities of the
132. Gay Lib v. Univ. of Missouri., 416 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Mo. 1976),
overruled by 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434
U.S. 1080 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
133. Hunter, supra note 116, at 1702.
134. Gay Lib, 416 F. Supp. at 1354.
135. Id. at n.1.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at n.2.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1359.
141. Id.
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homosexual members of those organizations . . . ; (2) tend to
cause latent or potential homosexuals who become members
to become overt homosexuals; [and] (3) tend to expand
homosexual behavior which will cause increased violations”
of the state’s sodomy law.142
Gay Lib filed suit in federal court, arguing that the
University’s decision violated the group’s First Amendment
rights.143 The district court denied Gay Lib relief, based on
the testimony of two psychoanalysts who predicted that
formal recognition of the group would “tend to further
homosexual behavior” and “promote such sexual conduct,”
thereby leading to violations of the state’s sodomy law.144
Like the University, the experts reasoned that the group
was likely to reinforce the personal identities and behaviors
of the group’s members145 because “wherever you have a
convocation of homosexuals, . . . you are going to have
increased homosexual activities.”146 The following year, the
Eighth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the university’s
fears of advocacy and recruitment had not been sufficiently
proved. In particular, the court found that there was “no
historical or empirical basis”147 for the testimony of the two
experts, and that “none of the purposes or aims of Gay
Lib . . . evidences advocacy of present violations of state
law.”148
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Gay Lib,
allowing the Eighth Circuit’s ruling to stand.149 In a dissent
from this ruling, then-Justice Rehnquist articulated a
remarkable example of the newly modernized fear of the
queer child.150 Although Justice Rehnquist acknowledged
142. Id. at 1358.
143. Id. at 1352.
144. Id. at 1368-69.
145. See id. at 1358.
146. Id. at 1369.
147. Gay Lib v. Univ. of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848, 854 (8th Cir. 1977).
148. Id. at 856.
149. Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978).
150. Id. at 1080-86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

644

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

that Gay Lib had disclaimed any intention “to proselytize,
convert, or recruit,”151 he reasoned that the expert testimony
had proven that “the meeting together of individuals who
consider themselves homosexual in an officially recognized
university organization can have a distinctly different effect
from the mere advocacy of repeal of the State’s sodomy
statute.”152 The effect he was referring to, of course, was the
spread of homosexuality across campus.
In an effort to explain why this risk was especially
significant among college students, Justice Rehnquist then
sought to establish a developmental link between “late
adolescence” and “early adulthood”: “As the University has
recognized, this danger may be particularly acute in the
university setting where many students are still coping with
the sexual problems which accompany late adolescence and
early adulthood.”153 To emphasize the virulent nature of
homosexuality in this setting, he explained that from the
University’s point of view, the question of whether Gay Lib
should be recognized was “akin to whether those suffering
from measles have a constitutional right, in violation of
quarantine regulations, to associate together and with
others who do not presently have measles, in order to urge
repeal of a state law providing that measle sufferers be
quarantined.”154 Although he did not explicitly delineate the
mechanism through which homosexuality would be
transmitted, he clearly implied that the group’s advocacy of
gay rights would lead more students to develop homosexual
desires, engage in homosexual conduct, and identify as
lesbian, gay, or bisexual.
By the time Rehnquist’s dissent was published, Anita
Bryant’s warnings about “homosexual recruitment” were
already national news. On January 18, 1977, Dade County,
Florida had adopted a local ordinance prohibiting
discrimination based on “sexual and affectional preference”

151. Id. at 1083.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1084.
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in employment, housing, and public accommodations.155 In
response, Bryant launched the “Save Our Children”
campaign, an organized effort to repeal the ordinance by
popular referendum.156 In the annals of the LGBT
movement, Bryant’s campaign stands out as the clearest
example of how opponents have invoked the fear of the
queer child to frame the country’s debates over LGBT
rights. In addition, it marks the moment in which the
opposition’s new fear of indoctrination was nationalized and
popularized. In the years that followed, this rhetoric
gradually displaced the fear of seduction as a primary
justification for anti-LGBT policies.
The twin pillars of Bryant’s campaign were her
repeated claims of “homosexual recruitment” and her
specific focus on the vulnerability of children to the
influence of openly gay teachers. In the campaign’s opening
press conference, Bryant held up a pamphlet on
homosexuality that she claimed gay teachers had been
distributing at local high schools.157 In a series of media
appearances, she repeatedly argued that “because
homosexuals cannot reproduce, they must recruit.”158
Playing upon a national frenzy about “child pornography
rings,”159 the campaign produced a series of newspaper
advertisements that sought to conflate homosexuality with
pedophilia. In these ads, the campaign displayed slogans
like, “Are Homosexuals Trying To Recruit Our Children?”160
and “There Is No Human Right To Corrupt Our Children”161
in bold print, above collages of old newspaper headlines in
which men were accused of luring young boys into
pornography and prostitution networks.
155. FRED FEJES, GAY RIGHTS AND MORAL PANIC: THE ORIGINS
DEBATE ON HOMOSEXUALITY 2, 69 (2008).
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156. Id. at 2-3.
157. CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 126, at 299.
158. Id. at 303.
159. JENKINS, supra note 52, at 124-25.
160. MARK D. JORDAN, RECRUITING YOUNG LOVE: HOW CHRISTIANS TALK ABOUT
HOMOSEXUALITY 143 (2011).
161. CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 126, at 303-04.
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As this rhetoric reveals, Bryant’s campaign often used
the term “recruitment” as a bridge between the old fear of
seduction and the new fear of indoctrination. Yet even as
the campaign juxtaposed old and new threats, it subtly
distinguished between them. In one press interview, Bryant
remarked: “[T]he stories I could tell you about child
recruitment and child abuse by homosexuals would turn
your stomach.”162 Note the distinction: Bryant claims that
“child recruitment” has the same effect as “child abuse,” but
she does not equate the two terms. In another
advertisement, the campaign claimed that homosexuals
were responsible for “a hair-raising pattern of recruitment
and outright seduction and molestation,” and warned voters
that this pattern would “intensify” if the ordinances were
permitted to stand.163 By contrasting “recruitment” with
“outright seduction and molestation,” the campaign
introduced Americans to a new theory of how queerness
could spread. In a speech before the Kiwanis Club, Bryant
emphasized that “the danger of the homosexual becoming a
role model for our children” was not just “physical” but
“psychological molestation,” and claimed that the latter was
“even more detrimental.”164
The Save Our Children campaign was astonishingly
successful. Only six months after the county’s
antidiscrimination ordinance was passed, it was repealed by
voters in a two-to-one landslide.165 The next day, the Florida
Legislature passed the country’s first law banning any
“homosexual” person from adopting a child.166 During the
campaign, Bryant had garnered national media attention
and attracted support from religious and conservative
leaders, such as the Reverend Jerry Falwell and United
States Senator Jesse Helms.167

162. Kondracke, supra note 53, at 14 (emphasis added).
163. CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 126, at 304 (emphasis added).
164. JORDAN, supra note 46, at 143.
165. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 65, at 212.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 211; CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 126, at 300, 306.
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Bryant’s campaign marked the beginning of a religious
conservative backlash against the LGBT movement.168 In
the following year, similar campaigns were launched in
Wichita, Kansas, St. Paul, Minnesota, and Eugene, Oregon,
which led voters to repeal local anti-discrimination laws by
similar margins.169 Bryant’s popularity faded after a series
of protests and a strange interview in Playboy magazine, in
which she claimed that homosexuals should be sent to
prison “where they will have plenty of time to think,” and
she predicted that “Jews, Moslems, Pygmies, Egyptians,
and atheists” would be condemned to hell.170 But her early
work in Dade County had established a template for
opposition to the LGBT movement. In one form or another,
religious conservatives have been replicating and refining
Bryant’s campaign since the late 1970s.171
Since Bryant’s campaign, the fear of indoctrination has
been most prominently featured in campaigns targeting
LGBT teachers and students in public schools. Months after
Bryant’s victory in Florida, California Senator John Briggs
announced his sponsorship of a ballot initiative prohibiting
the employment of any public school employee who “engages
in public homosexual activity and/or public homosexual
conduct directed at, or likely to come to the attention of
school children and/or other employees.”172 Under the terms
of the initiative, “public homosexual conduct” was defined
broadly to include “the advocating, soliciting, imposing,
encouraging or promoting of private or public homosexual
activity directed at, or likely to come to the attention of
school children and/or other employees.”173 Briggs named his
campaign “California Save Our Children,” and he justified
168. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 65, at 211-12.
169. See FEJES, supra note 155, at 153-79.
170. In this interview, Bryant claimed that homosexuals should be sent to
prison “where they will have plenty of time to think,” added that “Jews,
Moslems, Pygmies, Egyptians, and atheists” were going to hell, and admitted
that she harbored hostile feelings toward her husband and men in general. See
id. at 193; ESKRIDGE, supra note 65, at 212.
171. See CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 126, at 535.
172. ESKRIDGE, supra note 65, at 225.
173. Id.
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the initiative as an attempt to remove gay teachers from
public schools: “What I am after is to remove those
homosexual teachers who through word, thought or deed
want to be a public homosexual, to entice young
impressionable children into their lifestyle.”174
By its own terms, however, the Briggs Initiative was
more ambitious than the senator had acknowledged; it
applied to both heterosexuals and homosexuals, and to the
“advocacy” of homosexuality in public and private
domains.175 As a result, the law would have disqualified any
teacher who expressed support for gay rights in a letter to
the editor, or even in a private conversation with a coworker.176 Although early polls indicated that the initiative
was likely to pass, it was defeated by a substantial margin
of voters.177
In the 1990s, opponents of LGBT rights shifted toward
a less ambitious campaign against the “advocacy” of
homosexuality in public schools, lobbying for new
restrictions
on
sex-education
and
AIDS-education
programs.178 In several states, legislatures adopted statutes
that required teachers to emphasize that “homosexual
conduct is not an acceptable lifestyle,”179 and prohibited
teachers from “promot[ing] a homosexual life-style”180 in

174. FEJES, supra note 155, at 183.
175. Hunter, supra note 116, at 1703; Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1352.
176. Hunter, supra note 116, at 1703.
177. Id. at 1704. Even if the Briggs Initiative had passed, it would not have
been likely to survive a constitutional challenge by gay teachers. In 1982, the
Oklahoma Legislature passed a law that closely tracked the language of the
Briggs Initiative, but the Tenth Circuit invalidated the law as a violation of the
First Amendment. Nat’l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Ed. Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d
1270 (10th Cir. 1984), aff’d by equally divided court, 469 U.S. 1203 (1985) (per
curiam).
178. Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1359-60.
179. Health and Safety Code Revision Act, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
85.007(b)(2) (West 2001).
180. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-716(C) (1999) (no school district may “promote[
] a homosexual life-style” or “portray[] homosexuality as a positive alternative
life-style”).
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public schools.181 Although federal courts have continued to
invalidate these laws,182 state legislatures have continued to
pass them.183
Given that Bryant’s campaign was successful in
repealing a local anti-discrimination law, it is not surprising
that opponents of LGBT rights have invoked her warnings
of homosexual recruitment to target other antidiscrimination laws. During the 1980s and early 1990s,
similar ballot initiatives were proposed in dozens of
municipalities across the state, and an overwhelming
majority of these initiatives were successful.184 In many of
these campaigns, opponents adopted Bryant’s focus on the
risk of gay teachers indoctrinating students into the
“homosexual lifestyle.”185
The most well-known of these initiatives was Colorado’s
Amendment 2, an amendment to the Colorado Constitution
that repealed local anti-discrimination ordinances and
prohibited the state legislature from passing a statewide
anti-discrimination law.186 Like other anti-gay political
181. See ALA. CODE § 16-40A-2(c)(8) (LexisNexis 2001) (requiring sex education
programs to emphasize that homosexuality is both socially unacceptable and a
criminal offense); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-81(el)(3) (2006) (prior to 2006
amendment) (requiring that education concerning sexually transmitted diseases
include “the current legal status” of homosexual acts); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A13-101 (LexisNexis 2006) (“[P]rohibiting instruction in . . . the advocacy of
homosexuality.”).
182. See, e.g., Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir.
1997).
183. See, e.g., East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. of Salt Lake
City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1197 & n.46 (D. Utah 1999) (citing Utah
Code Ann. 53A-3-419, which prohibits local school boards from granting access
to “any student organization or club whose program or activities would
materially and substantially . . . involve human sexuality”).
184. See Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 245, 257-60 (1997).
185. CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 126, at 299-305.
186. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996). Referring to the municipal
ordinances, the Court writes:
Amendment 2 repeals these ordinances to the extent they prohibit
discrimination on the basis of ‘homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.’ [In addition,] [i]t
prohibits all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state
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campaigns, the campaign for Amendment 2 was multifaceted, including a wide range of arguments against
protecting lesbians and gay men from discrimination in
employment, housing, and other domains.187 Predictably,
though, these appeals included warnings about the threat of
homosexual recruitment. In one pamphlet, for example,
Colorado for Family Values suggested that gay teachers
were already indoctrinating children in the state’s schools:
“Homosexual indoctrination in the schools? IT’S
HAPPENING IN COLORADO!”188
D. Role Modeling
In addition to popularizing the fear of “homosexual
recruitment,” Anita Bryant’s campaign introduced a subtler
theme into the anti-LGBT rhetoric of the 1970s—the notion
that an openly gay teacher would serve as a “role model”
who would subtly influence children’s sexual development.
As Bryant herself explained, the campaign was aware that
some voters had been skeptical of her most strident claims,
“[b]ut we also kn[e]w that many tolerant, broad-minded
citizens voted for repeal because they felt uneasy at the

or local government designed to protect the named class, a class we
shall refer to as homosexual persons or gays and lesbians.
187. See, e.g., STEPHEN BRANSFORD, GAY POLITICS VS. COLORADO AND AMERICA:
THE INSIDE STORY OF AMENDMENT 2, at 15-17 (1994) (claiming that antidiscrimination laws infringe on “the right not to associate with homosexuals,”
improperly subject “landlords and employers [to] lawsuit for dismissing . . . .
failing to rent to or hire a homosexual,” “make the courts the public solution to
private problems,” and give “homosexuality the legal power to force the rest of
the state to affirm their lifestyle”).
188. Colorado for Family Values, Equal Rights—Not Special Rights, at 2
(1992), reprinted in Robert Nagel, Playing Defense, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
167, 193 (1997). Amendment 2 was subsequently invalidated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1996. Romer, 517 U.S. at 620.
Although the fears that children will be recruited, indoctrinated, or proselytized
into homosexuality have been primarily aimed at LGBT teachers, they have also
appeared in visitation cases involving lesbian and gay parents. See Clifford J.
Rosky, Like Father, Like Son: The Gender of Homophobia, 20 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 257, 294-95 (2009) (citing In re J.S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 95-96 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974) [hereinafter Rosky, Like Father, Like Son]; Hertzler v.
Hertzler, 908 P.2d 946, 949 (Wyo. 1995)).
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prospect of an avowed homosexual becoming a role model
for their children.”189
Like the fear of recruitment, the fear of role modeling
has played a prominent role in justifications for anti-LGBT
policies since Stonewall. Only two days after Bryant’s
campaign was launched, the discourse of role modeling was
adopted by the Washington Supreme Court in a case
upholding the dismissal of a teacher “because he was a
known homosexual.”190 To justify this ruling, the court
emphasized that the teacher’s “homosexual conduct must be
considered in the context of his position of teaching high
school students.”191 The court reasoned that the teacher’s
homosexuality created the “danger of encouraging
expression of approval and of imitation” because “[s]uch
students could treat the retention of the high school teacher
by the school board as indicating adult approval of
homosexuality.”192
In the ensuing decades, the role modeling fear has
served as the primary justification for laws that target
LGBT parents, such as statutes prohibiting lesbian and gay
people from adopting. In 1987, the New Hampshire House
of Representatives proposed a bill banning “homosexuals . . .
from participating in governmentally sanctioned programs
of adoption, foster care, and day care” on the ground that
“the provision of a healthy environment and a role model for
children should exclude homosexuals.”193
Before voting on the bill, the House asked the Justices
of the New Hampshire Supreme Court to offer an advisory
opinion about whether it was constitutional.194 In response,
four of the five justices issued an opinion indicating that the
constitutionality of the law depended on the empirical
189. ANITA BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY: THE SURVIVAL OF
FAMILIES AND THE THREAT OF MILITANT HOMOSEXUALITY 126 (1977).

OUR

NATION’S

190. Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 559 P.2d 1340, 1341, 1347 (Wash.
1977).
191. Id. at 1347.
192. Id. (emphasis added).
193. In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 23 (N.H. 1987).
194. Id. at 22.
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plausibility of the legislature’s role modeling fear.195 On the
one hand, the justices found that the statute’s exclusion of
homosexuals from the state’s adoption and foster care
programs was constitutional, because it was “rationally
related” to the state’s legitimate interest in “provid[ing]
appropriate role models.”196 Although they recognized that
there was some disagreement about homosexuality’s
origins, they observed that “the source of sexual orientation
. . . is thought to be a combination of genetic and
environmental influences.”197 The justices reasoned: “Given
the reasonable possibility of environmental influences, the
legislature can rationally act on the theory that a role model
can influence the child’s developing sexual identity.”198
The justices balked, however, at applying “the role
model theory” to the employment of day-care providers. In
their view, “this theory most likely holds true in the parentchild or other familial context” because parents have
“custody of and control over the children so placed.”199 They
were not persuaded, however, that the role modeling theory
would hold true in the day-care context, because they found
that the “non-continuous nature of the provision of many
day-care services” was roughly comparable to “the noncontinuous nature of the supervision of children involved in
teaching.”200
Such reasoning may explain why courts have applied
role-modeling fears primarily to LGBT parents, rather than
LGBT teachers. In 1993, a Florida appeals court invoked a
subtler version of the role-modeling fear to justify the state’s
adoption law, even as it disavowed the fear that a gay
parent would “‘teach’ a child to become a homosexual.”201
195. Id. One of the four Justices joining the opinion was Justice David Souter,
a future Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Id.
196. Id. at 25.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Florida Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1220
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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The court reasoned that because “a very high percentage of
children available for adoption will develop heterosexual
preferences,” it was important for the state to provide
children with “heterosexual role models,” so adoptive
parents could give children “education and guidance” by
“telling stories about their own adolescence and explaining
their own experiences with the opposite sex.”202 While the
court emphasized that it was not relying on the fear of
homosexual recruitment, it nonetheless insisted on the
importance of providing children with heterosexual role
models: “Without reliance upon any unsubstantiated notion
that a homosexual parent could ‘teach’ a child to become a
homosexual, . . . the legislature may still decide that the
best interests of children require that they be adopted by
persons who can and will serve as heterosexual role
models.”203
In 2004, the Eleventh Circuit revived this logic in
another decision upholding the constitutionality of Florida’s
adoption law. In Lofton v. Secretary of Department of
Children & Family Services,204 the State of Florida claimed
that the adoption law was justified by the “vital role that
dual-gender parenting plays in shaping sexual and gender
identity and in providing heterosexual role modeling.”205
Invoking the reasoning of the state appellate court’s earlier
ruling, the Eleventh Circuit held that the law was
supported by “the influence of environmental factors in
forming patterns of sexual behavior and the importance of
heterosexual role models.”206
Throughout the post-Stonewall era, the rhetoric of role
modeling has played an equally prominent part in custody
and visitation cases involving lesbian and gay parents. In
1981, a Tennessee appellate court removed custody from a
lesbian mother, based on a psychologist’s testimony that it
would be “preferable” to raise Rusty, a four-year-old boy, in
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004), reh’g denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (2004).
205. Id. at 818.
206. Id. at 822.
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“a normal relationship wherein males and females adhere to
their roles”—as opposed to “a homosexual relationship
involving a mother in a submissive role”—because
“homosexuality is a learned trait and it would be very
difficult for Rusty to learn and approximate sex role
identification from a homosexual environment.”207 In 1982, a
Missouri appellate court restricted a gay father’s visitation
rights on the ground that the father had “directly testified
that he thought it would be ‘desirable’ for his child to
become a homosexual,” and had “furnished the boy with role
models consistent with that approbation.”208 In 1985, a New
York appellate judge concurred in a decision to restrict a
gay father from involving his child “in any homosexual
activities or publicity” during his visits, on the ground that
“a child’s sexual maturation and sense of sexual security
must be safeguarded so that the child will have a proper
identification as to what the parents’ role model should
be.”209 In another 1985 case, a Tennessee appellate court
denied a lesbian mother custody of her daughter on the
ground that “the homosexual parent and the minor child are
both female,” reasoning that “we consider this factor
particularly important because of the increased chance of
role-modeling.”210
In Dale v. Boy Scouts of America,211 the Supreme Court
recognized the fear of role modeling not as a justification for
the state’s anti-LGBT policies, but as a private
organization’s
defense
against
the
government’s
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws.212 In this wellknown case, the Boy Scouts had revoked the membership of
a scoutmaster named James Dale, in response to a
newspaper interview in which Dale had explained “his
207. Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
208. J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
209. Gottleib v. Gottleib, 488 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (Kassal,
J., concurring).
210. Bennett v. O’Rourke, 1985 WL 3464, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1985).
211. 530 U.S. 640, 652-53 (2000).
212. In Eskridge’s terms, the Dale ruling represents the “privatization” and
“constitutionalization” of the opposition’s “no promo homo” claims. See Eskridge,
supra note 5, at 1355-56, 1408-09.
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advocacy of homosexual teenagers’ need for gay role
models.”213 In upholding the Boy Scouts’ constitutional right
to terminate Dale on this basis, the Supreme Court
repeatedly emphasized the organization’s interest in
preventing gay men from serving as “role models.”214 In
particular, the Court relied on one of the organization’s
statements that “homosexuals do not provide a desirable
role model for Scouts.”215
E. Public Approval
Throughout this period, indoctrination and role
modeling fears have been supplemented with an even
subtler worry about children’s sexual development—the
idea that the government’s recognition of LGBT rights
sends a signal that the public approves of queerness. While
some opponents of LGBT rights claim that this dynamic
could potentially influence a person’s sexual behavior at any
age, they often insist that children are especially vulnerable
to the influence of state actors and policies.216 The fear of
public approval has been especially common in debates over
sodomy and marriage laws, which are widely viewed as
potent symbols of the public’s moral stance toward
homosexual relations and relationships.217
213. Dale, 530 U.S. at 645.
214. Id. at 652, 674.
215. Id. at 652; see also id. (“The Boy Scouts of America has always reflected
the expectations that Scouting families have had for the organization. We do not
believe that homosexuals provide a role model consistent with these
expectations.”).
216. GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE? 153 (2004) (“[E]vangelicals are more
likely to fear that any government, religious, or media legitimization of
homosexuality threatens the stability of heterosexuality itself by making
homosexuality seem a more acceptable, even appealing choice. They worry
especially about youth being exposed to such temptation, so take great care to
prevent their children from having any exposure to gay people.”).
217. I thank Michael Boucai for introducing me to the phrase “homosexual
relations and relationships” and for emphasizing the independent value of an
individual’s liberty to pursue relations and relationships. See Boucai, supra note
3, at 417 (arguing that “[t]he constitutional right to choose homosexual relations
and relationships is a universal freedom and inheres whatever one’s desire or
disposition to exercise it”).
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Only a few months after the Stonewall riots, California
Senator Willie Brown introduced the country’s first law
specifically designed to legalize sodomy and other private
sexual activities between consenting adults.218 It was
rejected each year until 1975, when it became the first bill
in the state’s history to pass the Senate by a single vote.219
Speaking in opposition to the bill, one senator remarked
that the bill’s passage would send a message to children
that “homosexuality is okay,”220 and another said that
sodomy was not a victimless crime because “children might
look upon homosexuality as acceptable” which “would harm
future generations.”221
Because the institution of marriage has tremendous
symbolic significance, the rhetoric of public approval has
been especially prominent in debates about same-sex
marriage. In the congressional debates over the federal
Defense of Marriage Act,222 the bill’s sponsors explicitly
conjured an image of Congress speaking to the country’s
youth, and strongly signaled that the bill was designed to
channel
children
into
heterosexual
relationships.
Representative Charles Canady, one of the bill’s chief
sponsors, made this objective especially clear by posing a
series of rhetorical questions about what lessons Congress
should impart to “the children of America”:
Should this Congress tell the children of America that it is a
matter of indifference whether they establish families with a
partner of the opposite sex or cohabit with someone of the same
sex? Should this Congress tell the children of America that we as a
society believe there is no moral difference between homosexual
223
relationships and heterosexual relationships?

In a legislative report supporting the bill,
Representative Canady cautioned Congress “against doing
218. Sex Bill Passes in Historic Tie-Breaker, ADVOCATE, May 21, 1975, at 4.
219. Id.
220. Id. (quoting Sen. H.L. Richardson).
221. Id.
222. 110 Stat. 2419 (Sept. 21, 1996), codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. §
1738C.
223. 104 CONG. REC. H7491 (1996) (statement of Rep. Charles Canady).
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anything which might mislead wavering children into
perceiving society as indifferent to the sexual orientation
they develop,” in order to protect society’s interest “in
reproducing itself.”224 Similar warnings have been sounded
by judges defending the constitutionality of laws against
same-sex marriage,225 and in the broader public debates
about the legalization of same-sex marriage.226
F. The Fear’s Many Forms
By denoting the fears of indoctrination, role modeling,
and public approval with separate terms, I do not mean to
suggest that they can be easily untangled in practice, or
even in principle. As a practical matter, all three of these
fears are voiced alongside each other more often than they
224. H.R. No. 104-664, at 15 n.53 (quoting E.L. Pattullo, Straight Talk About
Gays, COMMENT. 21 (1992)).
225. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 355 (D.C. Ct. App.
1995) (assuming that the state has a “substantial, if not compelling” interest in
prohibiting same-sex marriage “because of a concern that such marriages, if
deemed legitimate, could influence the sexual orientation and behavior of
children, to the extent choice plays a role”).
226. See, e.g., Trayce Hansen, Love Isn’t Enough: 5 Reasons Why Same-Sex
Marriage Will Harm Children, DRTRAYCEHANSEN.COM (Oct. 15, 2007),
http://www.drtraycehansen.com/Pages/writings_samesex.html (last visited May
7, 2013) (“[S]ame-sex marriage will increase sexual confusion and sexual
experimentation by young people. The implicit and explicit message of same-sex
marriage is that all choices are equally acceptable and desirable. So, even
children from traditional homes—influenced by the all-sexual-options-are-equal
message—will grow up thinking it doesn’t matter whom one relates to sexually
or marries. Holding such a belief will lead some—if not many—impressionable
young people to consider sexual and marital arrangements they never would
have contemplated previously.”); William J. Bennett, Gay Marriage: Not a Very
Good Idea, WASH. POST, May 21, 1996, at A19 (“There are other arguments to
consider against same-sex marriage—for example, the signals it would send,
and the impact of such signals on the shaping of human sexuality, particularly
among the young.”).
Most recently, the public approval fear has been invoked by opponents of antibullying initiatives in public schools. See, e.g., Kim Severson, Christian Group
Finds Gay Agenda in an Anti-Bullying Day, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2012, at A15
(reporting that the American Family Association objected that an anti-bullying
program known as “Mix It Up at Lunch Day,” which encourages students “to
hang out with someone they normally might not speak to,” was actually “a
nationwide push to promote the homosexual lifestyle in public schools”).
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are disaggregated. In Gay Lib, for example, the University
objected that granting formal recognition to the group
would “constitute an implied approval by the University of
the abnormal homosexual life-style as a normal way of life
and would be so understood by many students,” and worried
that “homosexuals will counsel other homosexuals,”227 which
would lead them to engage in illegal acts. Similarly, in
Gaylord, the court juxtaposed the dangers of “imitation” and
“approval.”228 In one custody case, a Pennsylvania court
managed to convey all three fears in a single sentence,
when it claimed that awarding custody to an openly lesbian
mother would “require the children to accept their mother’s
role, and to some extent, . . . proselytize the children by
indicating that because of the role model now found
acceptable, it is a suitable life style for the children.”229 In
this passage, the court imagines itself sending a signal of
public approval, which effectively “proselytizes” the children
by identifying a lesbian mother as an appropriate “role
model.”
Even in analytical terms, these three fears cover similar
ground. However they are framed, they are all based on the
same basic fear of children’s queerness, which has been
voiced in a variety of ways through the ages. In this sense,
any pro-LGBT reform could be criticized as a form of
indoctrination, role modeling, or public approval—and at
one time or another, it is likely that every pro-LGBT reform
has been characterized in such terms. In Bryant’s
campaign, for example, she objected to Dade County’s antidiscrimination law because it offered gay teachers the
opportunity to not only “recruit” children, but to serve as a
“role model,” and to signal “public approval” of the
“homosexual lifestyle.”230 This is one of the principal
strengths that opponents derived from the fragmentation of
the fear during this period: instead of relying on concrete
claims about men sexually molesting boys, they were able to
227. Gay Lib v. Univ. of Missouri, 416 F. Supp. 1350, 1359 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
228. Gaylord v. Tacoma Sch. Dist., 559 P.2d 1340, 1347 (Wash. 1977).
229. Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
230. See discussion supra Part III.D.
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invoke a much broader, more diverse range of theories to
justify discrimination against LGBT people.
G. The Return of the Gender-Variant Child
In recent years, the fear of the queer child has begun to
shift in ways that closely track Siegel’s “preservationthrough-transformation” model of the evolution of status
regimes. During the 1990s, opponents of LGBT rights
shifted away from explicit claims about children’s
homosexuality, in favor of increasingly vague claims about
children’s variance from traditional gender roles and
identities.231 Although this development has been especially
evident in custody cases involving boys raised by lesbian
mothers, it has also surfaced in constitutional challenges to
same-sex marriage bans and public debates over the
Employment Nondiscrimination Act.
In the long arc of history, this trend is decidedly recent,
but it reminds us that anything old can be new again: after
all, the specific fear of children becoming “homosexual” is
barely more than a century old, and even now, it is
routinely conflated with parallel fears of children becoming
gender variant. In this sense, this trend presents a return to
much earlier ideas about the relationship between sexuality
and gender, rather than the emergence of a distinctly new
set of ideas and fears. As Siegel reminds us, the
justifications for status regimes are often recycled, through
a process of translation into less contested, more socially
acceptable terms.232
As early as the 1990s, the fear of role modeling was
often expressed as a specific concern that boys raised by
lesbian mothers will experience “gender identity
problem[s].”233 In a 1990 case, for example, the Louisiana
231. Although gender identity is a distinct concept from gender roles, the two
ideas are often conflated by opponents of LGBT rights. See, e.g., Carlos Ball,
Lesbian and Gay Families: Gender Nonconformity and the Implications of
Difference, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 691, 705 (2003) (observing that judges often
conflate “gender identity” and “gender roles” in cases involving same-sex
adoptions).
232. Siegel, supra note 108, at 2179.
233. Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 639 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
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court cited a psychologist’s concerns that if a two-year-old
boy were raised by his lesbian mother, the boy may not
learn “masculine and female” roles, which the psychologist
referred to as “sex appropriate roles.”234 At a hearing on the
mother’s visitation rights, the psychologist explained: “I
would be concerned if the role models were confused so that
a child would not understand or know that this was not
typical or usual or to be expected.”235 The court awarded
primary custody to the father, based on a specific finding
that “the child is of an age where gender identity is being
formed.”236
As the millennium turned, the role modeling fear began
to surface in judicial opinions upholding state laws against
same-sex marriage—and here, too the claim was framed as
a fear about children’s gender roles rather than children’s
sexual identity, desire, or behavior. In 1999, the State of
Vermont argued that the state’s law against same-sex
marriage was justified by the government’s interest in
“‘promoting child rearing in a setting that provides both
male and female role models.’”237 Although the Vermont
Supreme Court rejected this logic, it conceded that this was
“[t]he most substantive of the State’s remaining claims,”
and that “[i]t is conceivable that the Legislature could
conclude that opposite-sex partners offer advantages in this
area.”238 Rather than denying that this goal was legitimate,
the court held that it was not consistent with Vermont’s
other statutes, such as a law that allowed children to be
jointly adopted by same-sex couples.239
234. Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1277; see also Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d at 639 (finding that exposing a
boy to “gays and lesbians was endangering his gender identity and morals”).
237. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 884 (Vt. 1999).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 884-85. As some scholars have noted, opponents of same-sex
marriage are often reluctant to specify the particular advantages bestowed by
“male and female role models,” but the term “role model” strongly implies that
children learn gender roles from parents of the same sex. Deborah A. Widiss,
Elizabeth N. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Stereotypes in Recent
Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 461, 489-92 (2007).
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In custody and visitation cases, the rhetoric of role
modeling seems to have waned in recent years, but it has
not disappeared yet. In 2007, a Louisiana Supreme Court
removed custody from a lesbian mother, based in part on
the father’s concern that “kids raised by lesbian parents are
more likely to grow up lesbian,” and a court therapist’s
testimony that the mother’s “lesbian partner would distort
the children’s (especially the girls’) perception of female role
models.”240
When searching for explanations of this rhetorical shift,
it is hard to ignore the striking parallels between law and
psychiatry on this subject: in the same DSM edition that the
APA abandoned the classification of homosexuality as a
mental disorder, the organization introduced a new
diagnosis known as “Gender Identity Disorder of
Childhood.”241 In the early 1990s, expert witnesses began
introducing this new diagnosis into custody and visitation
cases, much to the detriment of lesbian and gay parents.242
In a dissenting opinion in Goodridge v. Dep’t Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 999
n.27, 1000 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting), Justice Cordy made this
reasoning clearer than most when he argued that “same-sex couples . . . cannot
provide children with a parental authority figure of each gender,” and noting
that one study found “significant statistical differences in . . . gender roles [and]
sexual behavior” among children raised by lesbian and gay parents. In 2006,
New York’s highest court upheld the state’s law against same-sex marriage
through a similar logic: “The Legislature could rationally believe that it is
better, other things being equal, for children to grow up with both a mother and
a father. Intuition and experience suggest that a child benefits from having
before his or her eyes, every day, living models of what both a man and a woman
are like.” Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006).
240. Cook v. Cook, 965 So. 2d 630, 633-34 (La. Ct. App. 2007); see also Holmes
v. Holmes, 255 S.W.3d 482, 486 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007) (removing custody from
lesbian mother based partially on boy’s nonconformity with traditional gender
norms).
241. LAWRENCE D. MASS, 1 HOMOSEXUALITY AND SEXUALITY: DIALOGUES OF THE
SEXUAL REVOLUTION 214 (1990); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, How to Bring Your
Kids Up Gay: The War on Effeminate Boys, in TENDENCIES 156-57 (Eve Kosofsky
Sedgwick ed., 1993); Kenneth J. Zucker & Robert L. Spitzer, Was the Gender
Identity Disorder of Childhood Diagnosis Introduced into DSM-III as a
Backdoor Maneuver to Replace Homosexuality? A Historical Note, 31 J. SEX &
MARITAL THERAPY 31, 32 (2005).
242. See, e.g., Pleasant v. Pleasant, 628 N.E.2d 633, 637-41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993);
Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (La. Ct. App. 1990); see also Rosky,
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But we should be careful not to lay this development at
psychiatry’s doorstep, for it is likely a sign of broader forces
at work. The most notable are the enduring disjunction
between public attitudes about homosexuality and gender
variance and the related gap between the progress made by
the gay and transgender movements.
In recent years, this dynamic was vividly illustrated in
the
debates
over
the
federal
Employment
Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA), a bill to prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity in employment. In 2008, Representative Barney
Frank introduced an alternative version of ENDA that
excluded “gender identity” from the bill’s antidiscrimination protections.243 In defending this move, the
openly gay congressman explained that he had marshaled
enough votes to pass protections for “sexual orientation”
through the House of Representatives, but a group of swing
voters had objected to the inclusion of transgender workers
within the bill’s protections.244 In a remarkable sign of the
transgender movement’s progress, more than 300 LGBT
groups withdrew support for Frank’s limited bill, which he
was forced to amend.245
Ironically, however, the new solidarity of the gay and
transgender movement has provided opponents of LGBT
rights with a new target in attacks on ENDA, and a new
way of articulating Anita Bryant’s indoctrination fears. In
2010, the Traditional Values Coalition (TVC) launched
Like Father, Like Son, supra note 188, at 305-07 (analyzing the frequency of
gender development stereotypes in custody and visitation cases involving
lesbian and gay parents).
243. Russell Berman, Transgender Anti-discrimination Bill Becomes Tough
Sell for Centrist Dems, THE HILL (May 5, 2010, 5:56 PM),
http://www.thehill.om/homenews/house/96745-transgender-anti-discriminationbill-becomes-tough-sell-for -centrist-democrats.
244. Id. In fact, the bill was approved by the House of Representatives by a
vote of 235 to 184, but it was not voted upon by the Senate. In 2009, the bill was
once again amended to include gender identity protections. See WILLIAM
RUBENSTEIN ET AL., SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND LAW 423 (4th ed. 2012).
245. NLG Queer Committee Supports HRC Dinner Protestors, NLGSF.ORG,
www.nlgsf.org/content/nlg-queer-committee-supports-hrc-dinner-protestors (last
visited Mar. 14, 2013).
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“ENDA Hurts Kids,” a campaign against the passage of
ENDA, in anticipating of an upcoming congressional vote.
In a banner across the campaign’s homepage, the TVC
asked: “Do you want men dressed as women teaching your
kids?”246 In lieu of an answer, the organization issued the
following alert to the American public:
Under the so-called, Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA), your children will be trapped in classes taught by
drag queens and transgender activists. Students will be
indoctrinated that “alternative lifestyles” are no different than
traditional lifestyles. Young children will be forced to learn about
247
bizarre sexual fetishes—and you will have no say in the matter.

“If ENDA becomes law,” the TVC warned, “she-male
activists and cross-dressing teachers will hold your child
hostage in the classroom.”248 “Once this happens, every
homosexual, bisexual, and transgender teacher will have
free reign to indoctrinate our children into accepting these
‘alternative lifestyles’ as normal and good.”249
While it may be tempting to dismiss the TVC’s rhetoric
as a vestige of a bygone era, the campaign managed to focus
the media’s attention on ENDA’s protections for
transgender teachers. One month after the campaign was
launched, CBS News featured an online debate between
Andrea Lafferty, the TVC’s President, and Allyson
Robinson, the Human Rights Campaign’s leading
spokesperson on transgender issues. In a segment titled
“Debate Over Transgender Teachers,” reporter Nancy
246. The Issues, TRADITIONAL VALUES COALITION (Mar. 13, 2010),
http://web.archive.org/web/20100313120658/http://www.endahurtskids.com/issu
es/ (accessed by searching for www.endahurtskids.com in the Internet Archive
index).
247. Home,
TRADITIONAL
VALUES
COALITION
(Mar.
13,
2010),
http://web.archive.org/web/20100313120658/http://www.endahurtskids.com/issu
es/ (accessed by searching for www.endahurtskids.com in the Internet Archive
index).
248. Why It Matters, TRADITIONAL VALUES COALITION (Mar. 13, 2010),
http://web.archive.org/web/20100313120658/http://www.endahurtskids.com/issu
es/ (accessed by searching for www.endahurtskids.com in the Internet Archive
index).
249. The Issues, supra note 246.
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Cordes introduced the subject by describing ENDA as a law
that “would protect employees on the basis of sexual
orientation or gender identity, including transgender and
transsexual teachers.”250 Throughout this ten-minute
segment, Lafferty repeatedly claimed that ENDA would
deny children a “safe environment”251 by requiring them to
hire transgender teachers, that gender identity disorder
was a “mental disorder,”252 and that it would be “very
confusing”253 for children to be taught by transgender
teachers.
It is surely a sign of the times that thirty years after
Bryant’s campaign, Andrea Lafferty now targets
transgender teachers, rather than lesbian, gay, or bisexual
teachers. Sensing that some things have changed since the
1970s—and yet, that other things haven’t—Lafferty claims
that children would be “confused” by transgender teachers,
much as Bryant claimed that children would be “confused”
by the presence of “avowed homosexual teachers.” In fact,
when the reporter specifically asked Lafferty whether she
would object to limited protections for gay teachers, Lafferty
deftly avoided taking any position on that issue by referring
back to the LGBT movement’s internal controversy over the
inclusion of gender identity protections in ENDA:
Reporter: If you take the transgender piece out of it, where do
you stand on sexual discrimination against gays and lesbians?
Lafferty: Well, you can’t do that because there is a commitment by
the gay and transgender community and the leadership of this
Congress that it will be a package. So we can only discuss ENDA
254
in relation to gender identity remaining in the bill.

Even as Lafferty illustrates the movement’s striking
progress since Stonewall, she testifies to the flexibility and
durability of the fear of the queer child.
250. Debate Over Transgender Teachers, CBS NEWS, at 0:10, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/ watch/?id=6414895n.
251. Id. at 2:25; 6:58; 8:36.
252. Id. at 2:39; 9:17.
253. Id. at 3:06; 7:08.
254. Id. at 9:18-9:40.
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IV. JUST THE FACTS?
During Bryant’s crusade in Florida, gay activists
struggled with how to answer her charges of child
molestation and recruitment.255 Initially, they hoped to
ignore these claims, rather than giving them the publicity
and dignity of a formal response.256 But as the vote grew
closer, they felt compelled to defend themselves. In the
campaign’s final days, a coalition of advocates ran two fullpage newspaper ads that sought to counter Bryant’s “myths
and lies” with statistics from scientific and legal authorities,
and they flew in a team of leading psychiatrists and
psychologists.257 At a press conference, the experts told
reporters that “homosexuality has nothing to do with child
molestation,” there was “no evidence” that children’s sexual
development could be influenced by “homosexual role
models,” and that “sexual orientation was established at a
young age, by three or four, before children entered
school.”258
In the years that followed, this strategy was widely
adopted by activists, lobbyists, and litigators in the LGBT
movement.259 With near unanimity, LGBT advocates have
challenged the fear of the queer child on strictly empirical
grounds.260 In legislatures, courtrooms, and media
255. See FEJES, supra note 155, at 98-99, 139.
256. Id. at 139.
257. Id. at 139; CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 126, at 304-05.
258. FEJES, supra note 155, at 126; CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 126,
at 304-05.
259. The question of how to define the LGBT movement is admittedly complex,
as it raises a host of “theoretical and empirical questions about movement
boundaries.” Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J.
663, 675 (2012). A full treatment of these questions is beyond this Article’s
scope. For present purposes, it is sufficient to clarify that when this Article uses
the phrase “LGBT movement,” it refers widely to the group of activists,
litigators, and lobbyists who identify themselves as part of a broader movement
for LGBT equality or LGBT rights.
260. The near unanimity of this view among activists, lawyers, and scholars
has been noted by scholars on both sides of debates over same-sex marriage and
LGBT parenting. See Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the
Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 159, 160 (2001) (“This
body of research, almost uniformly, reports findings of no notable differences
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appearances, they have argued that most child molestation
is heterosexual, sodomy laws have nothing to do with
children, marriage laws have nothing to do with schools,
and children raised by lesbian and gay parents are no
different than children raised by heterosexual parents.
Above all, advocates have insisted that children’s sexual
orientation and gender identity are fixed early in life and
cannot be learned, taught, chosen, or changed.
In pursuing a strictly empirical response to the fears of
indoctrination, role modeling, and public approval, the
LGBT movement has run headlong into two basic
challenges. The first challenge is that even after decades of
study, the causes of homosexuality and gender variance
remain mysterious.261 The American Psychological
Association frankly acknowledges this fact: “[A]lthough
much research has examined the possible genetic,
hormonal, developmental, social, and cultural influences on
sexual orientation, no findings have emerged that permit
scientists to conclude that sexual orientation is determined
between children reared by heterosexual parents and those reared by lesbian
and gay parents . . . .”); Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual
Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 837 (1997) (observing that the
“unanimity” of this opinion is “remarkable”).
While it is always difficult to prove an absence, my review of the historical
literature on the LGBT movement has revealed only a handful of LGBT
advocates who bucked this trend before the new millennium. These exceptions
are discussed infra in Part V, Section A. On the history of the LGBT movement,
see generally, ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS AND INTO THE COURTS
(2006); CHAUNCEY, supra note 216; CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 126;
MARTIN DUPUIS, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, LEGAL MOBILIZATION, AND THE POLITICS OF
RIGHTS (2002); ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 82; LINDA HIRSHMAN, VICTORY:
THE TRIUMPHANT GAY REVOLUTION (2012); DANIEL PINELLO, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE
FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2006); Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay
Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551 (1993). In my previous work, I have
more thoroughly documented a similar trend in the specific context of custody
and visitation cases involving one lesbian, gay, or bisexual parent and one
heterosexual parent. See Rosky, Like Father, Like Son, supra note 188, at 330 &
n.413 (citing sources).
261. See Rosky, Like Father, Like Son, supra note 188, at 330; see also
SEDGWICK, supra note 11, at 40 (arguing that “any such adjudication [between
nature and nurture] is impossible to the degree that a conceptual deadlock
between the two opposing views has by now been built into the very structure of
every theoretical tool we have for undertaking it”).
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by any particular factor or factors. Many think that nature
and nurture both play complex roles.”262 Whenever a new
study is published, a new theory ascends—identical twins,
pheromones, fraternal birth order, hypothalamus, or the
ever-elusive “gay gene.”263 But the nature/nurture debate is
not over, and it does not seem likely to end in the
foreseeable future.
The second challenge is that, as Professor Janet Halley
once wrote, “anti-gay public policy is complex and flexible,
and finds ways to justify itself even on the assumption that
homosexual orientation in many, most, or all its bearers is
immutable.”264 Over the course of centuries, the fear of the
queer child has proved to be a remarkably nimble
adversary—broad, subtle, and manifold. It encompasses
concerns about children’s sexuality and gender, and within
each of these categories, it includes concerns about
children’s thoughts, behaviors, and identities. Like the facts
it describes, the fear is a moving target; it is hard to pin
down and dispute on empirical grounds.
This Part distinguishes sharply between the LGBT
movement’s strategic position vis-à-vis the old and new
versions of the fear. Because the act of child sexual abuse is
inherently harmful, there is only one plausible response to
the seduction fear: LGBT advocates must insist that the
fear is empirically false, because LGBT people are not child
molesters. In this instance, it does not matter whether
seduction makes children more likely to be queer, because
adult-child sex is per se harmful, regardless of whether it
causes anyone to be queer. But the fears of indoctrination,
role modeling, and public approval do not allege that
children suffer any independent harms—i.e., anything apart
from the supposed harm of queerness itself. As a result,
LGBT advocates have an opportunity to develop other
responses to these fears. Instead of challenging the
262. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS: FOR A BETTER
UNDERSTANDING OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND HOMOSEXUALITY 2 (2008).
263. See, e.g., Neil Swidey, What Makes People Gay?, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 14,
2005 (Magazine), at 38.
264. Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique
of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 567 (1994).
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empirical premise that queerness can spread from adult to
child, they can challenge the normative premise that
children are better off straight.
Without gainsaying the advantages and achievements
of strictly empirical challenges, this Part argues that the
time has come for the LGBT movement to advance
normative claims on behalf of children’s queerness. In
recent years, as the opposition’s responses have become
more sophisticated, and the movement’s goals have become
more ambitious, the empirical paradigm of advocacy has
begun to falter. In one situation after another, when the
empirical strategy is deployed against indoctrination, role
modeling, and public approval fears, it runs up against the
inherent uncertainty and incompleteness of the factual
record. As a result, LGBT advocates have struggled with
how best to answer the fear, which has resulted in a
handful of awkward and unsatisfying exchanges between
advocates and opponents. This Part identifies two such
moments in debates about indoctrination and role modeling,
in the hopes of persuading LGBT advocates to pursue a
more comprehensive attack on the fear’s premises.
A. Seduction: Debunked by Data?
In judicial opinions, the most infamous example of the
seduction fear appeared in J.L.P.(H.) v. D.L.P., a 1982
divorce case involving a gay father.265 In this case, a trial
court found that the father’s conduct toward his son had
been “seductive in nature.”266 Although the father’s
psychologists had testified that “most child molestation
occurs between adult heterosexual males and female
children,”267 “child molestation was approximately 95%
heterosexual,” and that “homosexual molestation is rare,”268
this evidence was rejected by the appellate court in strident
terms. “The experts’ testimony with respect to molestation
265. 643 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
266. Id. at 868.
267. Id. at 867.
268. Id.
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of minors is . . . suspect,” the court found.269 “Every trial
judge, or for that matter, every appellate judge, knows that
the molestation of minor boys by adult males is not as
uncommon as the psychological experts’ testimony
indicated.”270
In J.L.P.(H.), the court’s articulation of the seduction
fear was unusually explicit, but the father’s response to the
fear was quite typical. In a wide range of settings, LGBT
advocates have sought to debunk the seduction fear on
empirical grounds. Citing a long line of studies on sexual
abuse, they have routinely claimed that “heterosexual men
are overwhelmingly responsible for child abuse,”271 “the ‘vast
majority of sex crimes committed by adults on children are
heterosexual, not homosexual’”272 and “children are much
more likely to be sexually abused by heterosexuals than
homosexuals.”273
269. Id. at 869.
270. Id. To provide factual support for this remarkable statement, the court
observed that “[a] few minutes research discloses the following appellate
decisions involving such molestation,” citing seven criminal cases involving men
sexually abusing boys reported between 1957 and 1978. Id. In addition, the
court argued that the experts had not compared apples to apples: “It may be
that numerically instances of molestation occur with more frequency between
heterosexual males and female children, but given the statistical incidence of
homosexuality in the population, which the father claims is 5 to 10%,
homosexual molestation is probably, on an absolute basis, more prevalent.” Id.
271. Mary Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 165, 176 (1998); see also Mary Becker, Family Law in the Secular
State and Restrictions on Same-Sex Marriage: Two are Better than One, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1, 49 (2001); Erica Gesing, The Fight to Be a Parent: How Courts
Have Restricted the Constitutionally-Based Challenges Available to
Homosexuals, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 841, 860 (2004); Mark Strasser, Family,
Definitions, and the Constitution: On the Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 1027 (1991); Developments in the Law—Sexual
Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1629, 1639-40 (1989).
272. David K. Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial Assumptions,
Scientific Realities, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 360 (1994) (quoting Baker v.
Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121, 1130 (N.D. Tex. 1982)); see also Carlos A. Ball &
Janice Farrell Pea, Warring With Wardle: Morality, Social Science and Gay and
Lesbian Parents, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 253, 307 (1998).
273. Susan J. Becker, Child Sexual Abuse Allegations Against a Lesbian or
Gay Parent in a Custody or Visitation Dispute: Battling the Overt and Insidious
Bias of Experts and Judges, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 75, 95 (1996); see also Darryl
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Throughout the 1970s, the new fears of indoctrination,
role modeling, and public approval were laid alongside the
old fear of seduction, in a classic example of Eskridge’s
“sedimentation” hypothesis.274 But during the 1980s, the
fear of seduction was rapidly marginalized.275 Whereas
Bryant’s campaign had freely mixed the old with the new,
the coming years were dominated by more precise,
restrained objections to indoctrination, role modeling, and
public approval. Although the seduction fear was still
advanced by litigants, it was framed in increasingly vague
terms, and it was rarely relied upon by courts. Even as the
country was seized by AIDS-phobia, most judges remained
unwilling to accommodate the popular fear that gay fathers
might infect children with HIV. While a few litigants raised
allegations of child sexual abuse in custody battles, they
were almost uniformly rejected by courts.276
In light of the long history of the seduction fear, the
marginalization of this belief is one of the LGBT
movement’s most impressive achievements. As Suzanne
Goldberg has argued, it is worth pausing to consider how
this victory was accomplished.277 In light of the LGBT
movement’s emphasis on empirical claims about
homosexuality and child molestation, it may be tempting to
Robin Wishard, Comment, Out of the Closet and Into the Courts: Homosexual
Fathers and Child Custody, 93 DICK. L. REV. 401, 411 (1989) (“Studies of child
molestation suggest that sexual molestation of children is much more likely to
be performed by heterosexual than homosexual men.”).
274. See Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1331, 1338; see also In re J.S. & C., 324
A.2d 90, 95-96 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1974); discussion supra Part III.A.
275. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sticky Intuitions and the Future of Sexual
Orientation Discrimination, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1393-94 (2010) (noting that
“the intuitive link between gay men and the sexual predation of minors is one
that, while powerful in past decades, appears to have weakened in influence in
response to strong empirical evidence to the contrary” and that “the argument is
not made in mainstream fora”).
276. See, e.g., Rosky, Like Father, Like Son, supra note 188, at 293 (showing
that stereotype of gay male child molester has been rejected by courts in custody
and visitation cases since the 1990s). This is another example of the
phenomenon that Eskridge describes as the “sedimentation” of anti-gay
discourse. Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1331, 1338.
277. See Goldberg, supra note 275, at 1393-94.
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conclude that the empirical strategy worked, and that a
similar strategy should be deployed against the newer fears
of indoctrination, role modeling, and public approval. If
advocates debunked the old fear with data, why not try the
same tactic with the new fears? Why not argue that
indoctrination, role modeling, and public approval simply
don’t work—children can’t be discouraged from becoming
queer—rather than taking on the more divisive question of
whether children should be discouraged from becoming
queer?
It is important to note, however, that there are a few
leaps at work in this logic. First, it is not clear that the
seduction fear was actually debunked by the data—or at
least, not by the data alone. It seems equally plausible to
assume that the seduction fear was undermined by the
increasing openness of LGBT people during the 1980s,
which allowed individuals to challenge the stereotype of the
homosexual child molester with anecdotes—instead of, or at
least, in addition to, rigorous statistical studies.278 Second,
even if the seduction fear was debunked by the data, in
whole or in part, this approach may not be the best or only
way to challenge the opposition’s new fears of
indoctrination, role modeling, and public approval.
After all, there is something unique about the seduction
fear, which distinguishes it sharply from the fears of
indoctrination, role modeling, and public approval. Unlike
the others, the seduction fear claims that LGBT people
inflict indisputable harms against children—the physical
and psychological harms of sexual abuse—which are
independent of any potential impact on children’s sexual or
gender development. As a result, the LGBT movement was
left without any meaningful choice in formulating a
response to this argument. Advocates could not say, for
example, that the state had no legitimate interest in
protecting children from being sexually abused.
By contrast, the new fears of indoctrination, role
modeling, and public approval neither claim nor presume
that LGBT people inflict any independent harms upon
278. I thank Professor Carlos Ball for this insight.
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children, other than the alleged harm of queerness itself.
For this reason, the LGBT movement has other ways of
responding to these fears. Rather than relying on strictly
empirical claims, LGBT advocates can directly challenge the
legitimacy of the state’s interest in discouraging queerness,
and the fundamental premise that children are better off
straight.
B. Indoctrination: Nothing to do with Schools
In responding to the indoctrination fear, LGBT
advocates have flatly denied that LGBT people aim to
“indoctrinate” children into queerness, and that the state’s
adoption of pro-LGBT reforms would allow LGBT teachers
to “recruit” children into the LGBT “lifestyle.”
In 2008, these questions took center stage in the
controversy over same-sex marriage in California. In the
official ballot pamphlet for Proposition 8, the law’s sponsors
claimed that it “protects our children from being taught in
public schools that ‘same-sex marriage’ is the same as
traditional marriage.”279 Because “[s]tate law may require
teachers to instruct children as young as kindergarteners
about marriage[,]” they warned, “TEACHERS COULD BE
REQUIRED to teach young children there is no difference
between gay marriage and traditional marriage.”280 They
argued that public schools should not teach “our kids that
gay marriage is okay,” because “[t]hat is an issue for
parents to discuss with their children according to their own
values and beliefs.”281
Strictly speaking, none of this language explicitly lays
out the indoctrination fear. Although the pamphlet objected
to the possibility of children being taught that “gay
marriage is okay,” or “the same as traditional marriage,” it
did not identify the precise effect that such lessons would
279. Ron Prentice et al., Arguments in Favor of Proposition 8, CALIFORNIA
GENERAL
ELECTION
OFFICIAL
VOTER
INFORMATION
GUIDE,
voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/argu-rebutt8.htm (last visited May 6,
2013).
280. Id.
281. Id.
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have on children’s sexual development, or offer any other
reasons why they might be objectionable. But as a federal
court observed in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, any lingering
ambiguity in this message was resolved by one of the
campaign’s television ads, It’s Already Happened.282
In this commercial, the opening scene depicted a young
girl walking into her kitchen as she returned home from
school:
Girl: “Mom, guess what I learned in school today?”
Mother: “What, sweetie?”
Girl: “I learned that a prince can marry a prince, and I can marry
283
a princess!”

As the girl delivers this presumably dreadful news, she
presents her mother with King and King, a children’s book
about the marriage of two princes. While the mother’s
frowning face lingers in the background, a law professor
appears in the foreground to underscore the plausibility of
this scenario: “Think it can’t happen? It’s already
happened.”284 The professor then proceeds to describe Parker
v. Hurley,285 a Massachusetts case in which parents were
denied the right to exempt their children from elementary
school lessons that featured children’s books about same-sex
couples. As the ad ends, a narrator concludes: “Under
California law, public schools instruct kids about marriage.
Teaching kids about gay marriage will happen here unless
we pass Proposition 8.”286
A few weeks after this ad was broadcast, California’s
leading LGBT organizations aired a counterattack, Prop 8
282. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010); see
also Melissa Murray, Marriage Rights and Parental Rights: Parents, the State,
and Proposition 8, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 357, 380-81 (2009) (describing
television ads in support of Proposition 8).
283. Yes On 8 TV Ad: It’s Already Happened, YOUTUBE (Oct. 7, 2008),
www.youtube.com/watch?v=0pgjgqFYP4.
284. Id.
285. 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008).
286. Id.
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Has Nothing To Do With Schools,287 which sought to refute
the campaign’s message on empirical grounds. As the
commercial begins, a narrator asks, “Have you seen the TV
ads for Prop 8?”288 while the girl and the mother from It’s
Already Happened appear in the background. “They’re
‘absolutely not true,’” he insists, quoting California’s
Superintendent of Public Schools.289 As the scene shifts, the
superintendent elaborates. Sitting on his desk in a suit,
under his official title, he explains: “Prop 8 has nothing to
do with schools, or kids. Our schools aren’t required to teach
anything about marriage. And using kids to lie about that is
shameful.”290
Within days, the sponsors of Proposition 8 responded
with two ads that sought to dramatize the law’s impact on
public school curricula. The first ad, Everything To Do With
Schools,291 featured two parents from the Parker v. Hurley
case complaining, “[a]fter Massachusetts legalized gay
marriage, our son came home and told us the school taught
him that boys can marry boys. He’s in second grade.”292 The
second ad, Truth, showed a class of first graders taking a
field trip to see a lesbian teacher’s wedding, and observed
that the Superintendent’s own website confirmed that
“teaching marriage is required in 96% of schools.”293 Prop 8

287. Prop 8 Has Nothing to Do With Schools, YOUTUBE (Oct. 22, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CIL7PUl24hE. In a recent article, Professor
Melissa Murray insightfully argues that the Proposition 8 advertising
campaigns successfully reframed the debate over same-sex marriage in a
manner that emphasized the threat of state interference with parental rights.
See Murray, supra, note 282, at 359-60.
288. Prop 8 Has Nothing to Do With Schools, YOUTUBE (Oct. 22, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CIL7PUl24hE.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Yes On 8 TV Ad: Everything To Do With Schools, YOUTUBE (Oct. 20,
2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7352ZVMKBQM.
292. Id.
293. Id.
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had been polling behind for several weeks, but it passed by
a margin of 52% to 48%.294

294. See Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage
Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235, 1321 (2010) (comparing public opinion polls on
Proposition 8 to timing of television commercials); Mark DiCamillo, Why Prop. 8
Confounded Pre-Election Pollsters, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 10, 2008, at B5 (“Doubledigit leads held by the ‘no’ side in the pre-television advertising stages of the
campaign declined precipitously as the TV ad campaigns hit in mid-to-lateSeptember.”).
Of course, it is possible to imagine more sophisticated empirical challenges to
the campaign’s ads, but I am skeptical that they would have fared any better in
the campaign against Proposition 8. For example, rather than vaguely insisting
that Prop 8 had “nothing to do with schools,” LGBT advocates could have
searched for other ways to challenge the campaign’s claims on empirical
grounds. For example: Advocates could have tried to explain that teaching
children about same-sex marriage is not the same thing as indoctrinating them
into it, or that teaching children about same-sex marriage is not the same thing
as teaching them about homosexual sex. But these distinctions seem far too
nuanced to convey in a television commercial, and far too subtle to allay fears
about exposing children to queerness.
More obviously, advocates could have tried to deny that children can be
indoctrinated, by insisting that a teacher can’t “teach” a child to become LGBT.
But this strategy seems unlikely to succeed, for both strategic and empirical
reasons. First, the campaign for Proposition 8 had not explicitly claimed that
teachers would instruct children to be queer; instead, the campaign had claimed
that teachers would instruct children “that there is no difference between gay
marriage and traditional marriage.” Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d
921, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2010). Under these circumstances, LGBT advocates would
have been ill-advised to claim that children cannot be “indoctrinated,” or
“taught” to be lesbian, gay, or bisexual. In an attempt to rebut this argument,
they would be re-introducing it—giving it more emphasis than the law’s
sponsors. Second, it is not clear whether LGBT advocates could have truthfully
denied that children can “learn” to be queer from a LGBT teacher, because there
is not much empirical data on this particular subject. To begin with the simplest
case, there do not seem to be any empirical studies that examine whether
children’s sexual and gender development is affected by having an openly LGBT
teacher. But even if we suppose that such a study existed, what would we
reasonably expect such a study to conclude? Even if a LGBT teacher cannot
“teach” a student to “become” lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender, it still
seems plausible that an openly LGBT teacher could facilitate a student’s
becoming queer in the broader sense—for example, in the sense of admitting,
accepting, and safely exploring one’s homosexual desires and variance from
traditional gender roles.
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C. Role Modeling: No Differences295
Over the years, the LGBT movement has articulated
two responses to the role modeling fear, which closely
parallel the movement’s response to the seduction fear.
First, they have claimed that the fear is logically absurd
because the “vast majority” of lesbian and gay people were
raised by heterosexual parents.296 Second, they have claimed
that the fear is demonstrably false because empirical
studies have found “no differences” in the sexual and gender
development of children raised by lesbian and gay
parents.297 Although numerous researchers have advanced
these claims, they have not held up well to independent
review.
In 2001, sociologists Judith Stacey and Timothy Biblarz
published a comprehensive meta-analysis of the bestdesigned parenting studies, in which they found that
researchers had “downplay[ed]” significant differences in
the sexual development of children raised by lesbian and
gay parents.298 Although the authors were sympathetic to
the cause of lesbian and gay parenting, they found evidence
that some children raised by lesbian and gay parents were
more likely to entertain same-sex fantasies, engage in samesex behavior, and identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual, and
less likely to conform with traditional gender norms.299
295. The first four paragraphs of this Section have been adapted, with
modifications, from Clifford J. Rosky, Perry v. Schwarzenegger and the Future
of Same-Sex Marriage Law, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 913, 945-46 (2011).
296. Ball & Pea, supra note 272, at 287; see also Marc E. Elovitz, Adoption by
Lesbian and Gay People: The Use and Mis-use of Social Science Research, 2
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 207, 213 (1995); Flaks, supra note 272, at 369; Kari
E. Hong, Parens Patri[archy]: Adoption, Eugenics, and Same-Sex Couples, 40
CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 57 (2003); Kathryn Kendell, The Custody Challenge:
Debunking Myths About Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children, 20 FAM.
ADVOC. 21, 24 (1997); Julie Shapiro, Custody and Conduct: How the Law Fails
Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children, 71 IND. L.J. 623, 651 n.158 (1996);
Philip S. Gutis, Homosexual Parents Winning Some Custody Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 1987, at C1.
297. Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 260, at 163.
298. Id. at 159.
299. Id.
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In particular, Stacey and Biblarz cited one study
indicating that the daughters of lesbian mothers were more
likely to entertain same-sex fantasies, engage in same-sex
behavior, and violate traditional gender norms,300 and
another study indicating that the sons of gay fathers were
more likely to identify as gay or bisexual in adulthood. 301 In
2010, they published a follow-up analysis in which they
found additional evidence that the daughters of lesbian
mothers were more likely to engage in same-sex behavior
and less likely to identify as heterosexual, and that the sons
of lesbian mothers had “greater gender flexibility” than
other boys.302
The LGBT movement’s response to these articles offers
a case study in how the fear of the queer child has
influenced the empirical study of LGBT parenting.303
Opponents of LGBT rights have warmly welcomed the
Stacey and Biblarz article,304 but most LGBT advocates have
studiously avoided discussing it. Rather than confronting
the possibility that children exposed to queerness may be
more likely to become queer, most LGBT advocates have
either failed to mention the study at all, or they have
glossed over the study’s controversial findings about
children’s sexual and gender development.305
In contrast to legal scholars, psychologists have seemed
more willing to acknowledge these findings—but they too
have shown little interest in entertaining or exploring them.
300. FIONA L. TASKER & SUSAN GOLOMBOK, GROWING UP
EFFECTS ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT 150-51 (1997).

IN A

LESBIAN FAMILY:

301. J.M. Bailey et al., Sexual Orientation of Adult Sons of Gay Fathers, 31
DEVEL. PSYCHOL. 124, 124 (1995).
302. Timothy J. Biblarz & Judith Stacey, How Does the Gender of Parents
Matter?, 72 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 3, 14-15 (2010).
303. See Rosky, Like Father, Like Son, supra note 188, at 336.
304. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Considering the Impacts on Children & Society
of “Lesbigay” Parenting, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 541, 550, 561 (2004).
305. WILLIAM RUBENSTEIN, CARLOS BALL & JANE SCHACTER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 731 (3d ed. 2007) (“Most of the
responses to Wardle continued to insist that children raised by gay parents were
no different than those raised by heterosexuals.”); Rosky, Like Father, Like Son,
supra note 188, at 336-37; Rosky, supra note 295, at 947.
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In 2003, Susan Golombok and her colleagues sharply
criticized Stacey and Biblarz for overemphasizing
differences found in only a handful of variables, while
ignoring a much larger set of variables in which no
differences had been found.306 In addition, Golombok et al.
observed that Stacey and Biblarz had made “no distinction”
between children’s gender identity and gender roles, on the
one hand, and children’s gender attitudes, on the other
hand.307 Within the psychological literature, they explained,
“it is well-established . . . that gender identity and gender
role behavior are relatively fixed and central to children’s
well-being and self-esteem, whereas attitudes are more
open to parental influence and change.”308
The following year, the American Psychological
Association joined the fray in a series of amicus briefs filed
in same-sex marriage cases. In one brief after another, the
APA insisted that “most published studies have not found
reliable differences in social gender role conformity between
the children of lesbian and heterosexual mothers.”309 In a
footnote, the APA acknowledged that Stacey and Biblarz
had found otherwise, but they rejected most of the
statistical conclusions that Stacey and Biblarz had reached:
“We have reviewed the studies cited by Stacey and Biblarz,
however, and only the two cited in the first paragraph of
this footnote (which appear to have been derived from the
same ongoing study) actually reveal significant differences
in this regard.”310
In both of these critiques, something is conspicuously
absent—any discussion of children’s sexual identity, desire,
or behavior. Surely Golombok was aware that Stacey and
Biblarz had broached the subject; she was a co-author of the
306. Susan Golombok et al., Children with Lesbian Parents: A Community
Study, 39 DEVEL. PSYCHOL. 20, 21 (2003).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Brief of American Psychological Association and New Jersey
Psychological Association as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Lewis v. Harris, 2004 WL 5456200, at *45 (N.J. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2004).
310. Id. at n.73.
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1997 study on which they had principally relied.311 Likewise,
in the APA’s amicus briefs, the possibility of children’s
queerness has not been acknowledged. Although the APA
insists that homosexuality is not “harmful [or]
undesirable,”312 and acknowledges that the etiology of sexual
orientation is “not well understood,”313 the organization
continues to reject the role modeling fear on strictly
empirical grounds: “[T]he available evidence indicates that
the vast majority of lesbian and gay adults were raised by
heterosexual parents and the vast majority of children
raised by lesbian and gay parents eventually grow up to be
heterosexual.”314 The briefs do not mention that until
recently, the effect of parental sexual orientation on
children’s sexual development had been carefully examined
in only a single longitudinal study—Golombok’s 1997
study—which had found statistically significant differences
in the sexual ideation and behavior of children raised by
lesbian mothers.315
The controversy continues. In 2010, two new studies
cast further doubt on the empirical case against the role
modeling fear. First, Henny Bos and Theo Sandfort
published a study in which they found that “children in
lesbian families were less certain that in the future they
would experience heterosexual attraction and engage in
heterosexual relationships.”316 In a remarkable sign of the
times, this is precisely what the authors had hypothesized.
In developing the study, they presumed that girls raised by
lesbian mothers would be “less confident” about whether
they would “marry a man,” “have a family together with a
man,” “live together with a man,” “have a child together

311. See Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 260, at 169, 173, 182.
312. Brief of American Psychological Association, supra note 309, at *46.
313. Id. at *47.
314. Id.
315. See Stacey & Biblarz, supra note 260, at 169, 173, 182.
316. Henny Bos & Theo Sandfort, Children’s Gender Identity in Lesbian and
Heterosexual Two-Parent Families, 62 SEX ROLES 114, 119 (2010).

680

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

with their husband,” and “be in love with a man,” and viceversa for boys.317
That same year, the United States National
Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study (NLLFS) published the
largest study ever conducted on children raised by lesbian
mothers. As the subtitle of the paper indicated, the study
was designed to measure “sexual orientation, sexual
behavior, and sexual risk exposure” for “adolescents” raised
in lesbian families.318 Based on a sample of 78 seventeenyear-old children raised by lesbian mothers, the study found
that none of the children had been physically or sexually
abused.319 With respect to sexual orientation, none of the 37
(0%) girls identified as homosexual, but seven (19%)
identified as bisexual, and another eleven (30%) identified
as
“predominantly
heterosexual,
incidentally
homosexual.”320 Of the 37 boys, the rates of homosexual and
bisexual identification were much lower: two (5%) identified
as homosexual, one (3%) identified as bisexual, and five 14%
identified as predominantly homosexual but incidentally
homosexual.321 With respect to sexual behavior, 15% of the
girls reported sexual activity with other girls, while 6% of
the boys reported sexual activity with other boys. 322

317. Id. at 117-18 (“We . . . expected children in lesbian families to have less
strong expectations of future heterosexual romantic involvement (higher sexual
questioning).”).
318. Nanette K. Gartrell, Henny M.W. Bos & Naomi G. Goldberg, Adolescents
of the U.S. National Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study: Sexual Orientation,
Sexual Behavior, and Sexual Risk Exposure, ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
1199, 1199 (Nov. 6, 2010).
319. Id. at 1201.
320. Id. at 1204.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 1205. Because this study did not include a control group, the
NLLFS researchers sought to compare these findings with national probability
samples. After gathering weighted samples from the 2002 National Survey of
Family Growth (NSFG), they found that only 5% of the NSFG girls had reported
same-sex activity, and 6% of the NFSG boys. Id. Based on these figures, they
reported that the NLLFS girls “were significantly more likely to have had
sexual contact with other girls,” but the boys were not significantly more likely
to do so. Id. at 1202.
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When the NLLFS study was published, one of the
study’s funders sought to downplay the NLLFS findings on
the impact of parental sexual orientation on children’s
sexual development. The press release announced, “New
Williams Institute Report Finds 0% of Adolescents Raised
by Lesbians Have Been Physically of Sexually Abused By
Parent.”323 In the first three paragraphs, the release focused
exclusively on the study’s findings that “none of the . . .
adolescents report[ed] having ever been physically or
sexually abused by a parent or other caregiver.”324 In the
final sentence, the release added: “On sexual orientation,
2.8% of the NLLFS adolescents identified as predominately
to exclusively homosexual.”325 The release did not include
any information about the sexual orientation of girls and
boys, the number of children who had identified as bisexual,
or the number of children who had reported sexual activity
with a person of the same sex.326
The NSFG survey had not asked seventeen-year-olds to identify as
heterosexual, bisexual, or homosexual, so the NLLFS authors were not able to
compare the rate of self-identification to a NFSG sample. But other available
data indicates that the 19% rate of bisexuality observed in the NLLFS study is
higher than national averages. In the 2006 NFSG data, for example, only 8% of
girls aged eighteen and nineteen identified as lesbian or bisexual, and only 9%
reported that they were incidentally attracted to other girls. Anjani Chandra et
al., Sexual Behavior, Sexual Attraction, and Sexual Identity in the United States:
Data From the 2006-2008 National Survey of Family Growth, 36 NAT’L HEALTH
STAT. REP. 1, 28-29 (Mar. 3, 2011).
323. Email from Williams Institute on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Law and Public Policy at UCLA School of Law, Nov. 10, 2010 (on file with
author).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. By acknowledging the uncertainties of this empirical debate, I do not
mean to suggest that the role modeling fear has been proven correct. In 2010,
Susan Golombok published yet another longitudinal study finding that children
raised by lesbian mothers were not significantly more likely to identify as
lesbian, gay, or bisexual. Susan Golombok & Shirlene Badger, Children Raised
in Mother-Headed Families From Infancy: A Follow-Up of Children of Lesbian
and Single Heterosexual Mothers, at Early Adulthood, 25 HUM. REPROD. 150,
155 (2010). And in 2011, one year after the NLLFS study was published, the
authors updated the NFSG national probability sample by drawing on a new
round of NFSG data collected between 2006 and 2008, a timeframe closer to
when the NLLFS data was collected. Nanette Gartrell, Henny Bos, & Naomi
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D. Public Approval: Truth and Consequences
Last but not least, there is the claim that the
government’s recognition of LGBT rights will send a
message to children that the state and society approve of
queerness, which will make children more likely to be
queer. The public approval fear is rarely addressed by
LGBT advocates—at least, not in so many words. In samesex marriage cases, advocates routinely argue that the
government has no ability to influence an adult’s sexual
orientation,327 but they do not generally formulate this
argument in terms of children or childhood.
Goldberg, Letter to the Editor, New Trends in Same-Sex Contact for American
Adolescents?,
ARCH.
SEXUAL
BEHAV.
1,
1
(Dec.
15,
2011),
http://www.nllfs.org/images/uploads/pdf/nllfs-letter-editor-december-2011.pdf.
Based on the 2006 NFSG data, the authors found that neither girls nor boys
raised by lesbian mothers were significantly more likely to engage in same-sex
behavior. Id. at 2.
We must remember, however, that the fear of the queer child applies to gender
roles, in addition to sexual orientation, gender identity, and sexual behavior.
And in 2012, yet another a study of adopted children found that “[s]ons of
lesbian mothers were less masculine in their play behavior,” when compared to
“sons of heterosexual parents,” or even “sons of gay fathers.” Abbie E. Goldberg
et al., Gender-Typed Play Behavior in Early Childhood: Adopted Children with
Lesbian, Gay, and Heterosexual Parents, 67 SEX ROLES 503, 503 (2012). Only
time will tell which of these findings will be confirmed by future studies, and
whether the evidence for a modest version of the role modeling theory will
continue to build.
In addition, I recognize that there are a number of ways to explain the
differences in this data without endorsing the fear that parents are serving as
“role models” for children’s sexual and gender development. For example, it
seems plausible to ask whether the studies are capturing systemic biases in the
children’s reporting patterns, rather than “real” differences in children’s
fantasies, interests, behaviors, and identities. It may be that children raised by
lesbian and gay parents are more likely to be candid with researchers, or with
themselves, than children raised by heterosexual parents. Moreover, in many of
these studies, the children were genetically related to at least one lesbian or gay
parent, which raises the possibility that the children’s sexual orientation was
influenced primarily by genetic rather than environmental factors. All of these
possibilities are plausible interpretations of the data, and any of them would
significantly undermine the empirical case for the role modeling fear.
327. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 972 (N.D. Cal.
2010) (“Permitting same-sex couples to marry will not affect the number of
opposite-sex couples who marry, divorce, cohabit, have children outside of
marriage or otherwise affect the stability of opposite-sex marriages.”); MARTHA
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In No Promo Homo, Professor Eskridge provides a rare
exception to this trend. Under the brave heading, Truth and
Consequences, Eskridge frankly admits that children are
the most common target of the opposition’s public approval
fears: “The most popular version of the no promo homo
argument is that a progay shift in state policy will be a
signal to the wavering adolescent that homosexuality is
okay, and the wavering adolescent might then choose
homosexuality as her sexual orientation.”328 In addition, he
notes that opponents of LGBT rights have claimed that
“progay policies will promote homosexual practices,
particularly sodomy,”329 and increase “people’s willingness to
be open about their homosexual orientation.”330 After
registering a number of caveats, Eskridge eventually
concedes that none of these claims can be resolved on
empirical grounds.
When compared to the cautiousness of the LGBT
movement, the candor of Eskridge’s conclusion is startling:

C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 146 (2010) (“If we were to study all recent cases of
heterosexual divorce, we would be unlikely to find even a single case in which
the parties [] felt that their divorce was caused by the availability of marriage to
same-sex couples. Divorce is usually an intimate personal matter bearing on the
nature of the marital relationship.”).
328. Eskridge, supra note 5, at 1366. While Eskridge’s willingness to engage
the fear of the queer child is admirable, his initial characterization of the fear as
a claim that an adolescent will “choose” to become homosexual seems
problematic. Although Eskridge does not define “homosexual orientation” in this
sentence, his usage indicates that he is referring to homosexual desire, rather
than behavior (“practices”) or identification (“openness”). Yet if this is his
meaning, he has already framed the fear of public approval as a straw
argument. Even the most zealous opponents of LGBT rights do not claim that
the state’s adoption of pro-LGBT policies will cause children to “choose”
homosexual desires. The only “choices” that opponents imagine are the decisions
to engage in homosexual behavior and identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. The
distinction is telling, because Eskridge seems to agree with his opponents on
both counts: a few pages later, he acknowledges that “engaging in sodomy is a
conscious choice” and “being openly GBLT is a matter of conscious choice that
state signals might affect over time.” Id. at 1366, 1369, 1371.
329. Id. at 1369.
330. Id. at 1371.
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Although there is no hard empirical evidence, it seems sensible
that abandoning no promo homo educational policies or adopting
gay-friendly ones would encourage more adolescents to be openly
gay or bisexual. . . . [T]he only likely consequence—but a big one—
of shifting policy in a progay direction is encouragement of more
open homosexuals and more public displays of homosexual
identity, and therefore of desire and practices imputed to that
identity in our sex-obsessed culture. . . . If kids see two women
marrying one another in a state-sanctioned ceremony, they might
ask their parents about how such a marriage can be
consummated, or they might engage in their own intramural
331
speculations.

Needless to say, many opponents of LGBT rights would
welcome this passage as the concession that killed the
LGBT movement. By admitting that the movement might
“encourage more adolescents to be openly gay or bisexual,”
and more “kids” to engage in “intramural speculations”
about same-sex relations and relationships, Eskridge seems
to play directly into the public’s worst fears, and the
opposition’s greatest strengths.
But Eskridge published this passage more than ten
years ago, and the LGBT movement is alive and well.
Following Eskridge’s lead, this Article means to ask: if we
suppose that his predictions were accurate, would the LGBT
movement stand defenseless? Must LGBT advocates
concede that the state has a legitimate interest in
encouraging children to be straight or discouraging children
from being queer?
V. A NORMATIVE CHALLENGE
To answer these questions, this Part lays out a
normative framework for challenging the fear of the queer
child. It begins by acknowledging that even in the 1970s
and 1980s, there were activists who questioned the
widespread assumption that children should be discouraged
from being or becoming queer. Rather than insisting that
children’s sexual and gender development could not be
influenced, they asked, “so what if children are queer?” By
posing such a provocative question, this vanguard suggested
331. Id. at 1371-72.
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that queerness is neither morally nor legally relevant to
children’s best interests. In the new millennium, this claim
has been taken up by a handful of legal scholars, lawyers,
and judges, reflecting a broader shift in cultural attitudes
toward children’s queerness. Borrowing from queer theorist
Lisa Duggan’s Queering the State, this Part conceptualizes
these claims under the rubric “No Promo Hetero.”332 It
insists that the government must adopt a neutral position
vis-à-vis children’s straightness and queerness, because it
has no legitimate basis for presuming that children are
better off straight.
A. So What If It’s True?
Even as early as Bryant’s campaign, there were LGBT
advocates who sought to challenge the fear of the queer
child on normative grounds. One notorious example was
Bob Kunst, a Dade County activist whom Bryant had
accused of handing out pamphlets about homosexuality at
local high schools. Throughout the campaign, Kunst
brazenly admitted that Dade County’s anti-discrimination
law would provide lesbian and gay youth with role models—
indeed, he identified himself as “an absolutely positive role
model,”333 and he claimed that providing children with gay
role models was one of the law’s principal benefits.334 In a
public meeting at a local church in Miami, Kunst speculated
that between ten and fifteen percent of children in Dade
County were already “homosexual”335—in his view, “people
were inherently bisexual; an individual’s specific sexuality
was in many ways a matter of choice; the goal was to
explore it.”336 He was especially fond of drawing an analogy
between sexuality and ice cream flavors: “Life is like icecream, there’s 38 flavors out there, you choose the flavor
you want.”337 He described his strategy in unapologetically
332. Duggan, supra note 8, at 8-9.
333. CLENDINEN & NAGOURNEY, supra note 126, at 301.
334. FEJES, supra note 155, at 81.
335. Id. at 131.
336. Id. at 67.
337. Id. at 68.
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radical terms, arguing that activists must “‘expose the root
of homophobic insecurity and call it like it is’ and be
‘outfront all the way through, redefining same-sex and bothsex experiences in terms of the beautiful new role models
they represent.’”338 However naïve Kunst may have seemed
during this era, he was not alone in making such claims. In
1981, Gore Vidal wrote in The Nation that “a teacher known
to be a same-sexer would be a splendid role model for those
same-sexers that he—or she—is teaching.”339
Queer theory’s founder, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, was
not far behind the likes of Kunst and Vidal. In 1989,
Sedgwick delivered a trail-blazing talk, How To Bring Your
Kids Up Gay: The War on Effeminate Boys, in which she
railed against society’s widespread “wish that gay people
not exist,”340 and in particular, the lingering “desire for a
nongay outcome” among childhood psychologists.341 In the
mid-1990s, Sedgwick’s battle cry was taken up by a new
vanguard of scholars in other fields. In 1994, psychologist
Laura Benkov observed that in custody and visitation cases
involving a lesbian or gay parent, both sides tacitly assumed
that children should be discouraged from becoming lesbian,
gay, or bisexual. Although she acknowledged that
“[r]efuting the worry that children raised by homosexuals
will themselves grow up to be gay was a pivotal step in the
legal advocacy for homosexual parents,”342 she emphasized
that it was only the first step, because it sought to answer
“homophobic questions on homophobic terms.”343 She
lamented: “It seems society is not ready yet for a more
deeply challenging response to the question of whether the
kids of homosexuals will grow up to be gay—namely, so
what if they do?”344
338. Id. at 147.
339. Gore Vidal, Some Jews and Gays, THE NATION, Nov. 14, 1981, at 512.
340. Sedgwick, How To Bring Your Kids Up Gay, supra note 23, at 23.
341. Id. at 24.
342. LAURA BENKOV, REINVENTING
LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTS 62 (1994).
343. Id. at 63.
344. Id.
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Shortly after this question was posed, it was taken up
by Professor Teemu Ruskola. In Minor Disregard, Professor
Ruskola launched the legal academy’s first normative
attack on the fear of the queer child. Drawing on both
Sedgwick and Benkov, Ruskola took direct aim at “the law’s
complicity in the production of the cultural fantasy that gay
and lesbian youth do not exist.”345 After presenting a
withering critique of the law’s discrimination against gay
and lesbian adolescents, Ruskola modestly proposed that
“[g]ay kids deserve recognition, respect, and protection,”346
and that “[t]he first step in the protection of gay kids must
be to see them as gay kids; unless the law is able to name
the child, it will be unable to safeguard him or her.”347
In the new millennium, such claims have been
addressed by a growing chorus of legal scholars. In 2002,
Professor Kenji Yoshino wrote in the Yale Law Journal that
“neither gay adults nor gay children will have achieved
equality with their straight counterparts until the ultimate
orientation of wavering children is a matter of state and
social indifference.”348 The following year, Professor Carlos
Ball claimed that the government has no legitimate interest
in encouraging children to conform to traditional gender
norms, because the state’s enforcement of such norms
violates the Equal Protection Clause.349 More recently, in
2010, philosopher Martha Nussbaum began her
constitutional argument for LGBT equality by invoking the
example of a boy who realized that he was gay in eighth
grade: “That ‘terrified’ gay teenager needs, and deserves,
equal respect, and a sphere of liberty equal to that enjoyed
by others.”350

345. Ruskola, supra note 14, at 273.
346. Id. at 272.
347. Id. at 273.
348. Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 863 (2002).
349. Ball, supra note 231, at 732; see also Susan Appleton, Missing in Action?
Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 97, 131-32 (2005).
350. NUSSBAUM, supra note 327, at xvii; see also id. at xii.
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These legal arguments have seemed to reflect and
reinforce a parallel trend in popular culture during the
same period. In 2005, Oprah Winfrey broadcast a show that
asked When Did You Know?, in which she interviewed a
series of gay men who described how they first realized that
they were gay “at age four,” “at age eight,” etc.351 In 2007,
Barbara Walters reported a story on 20/20 titled, “My
Secret Self: A Story of Transgender Children.”352 That same
year, actors Wanda Sykes and Hillary Duff were featured in
a public advertising campaign aimed at teenagers, which
criticized the phrase “that’s so gay” as “insulting” and
“offensive.”353 In 2010, columnist Dan Savage launched the
It Gets Better Project, in which adults record videos offering
reassuring advice to LGBT children who are bullied and
teased by peers.354 Most recently, the television drama Glee
has featured gay and transgender teenagers as prominent
characters,355 the media has devoted extensive coverage to a
series of suicides among LGBT youth, and the New York
Times Magazine featured a cover story titled, What’s So Bad
About a Boy Who Wants to Wear a Dress?356

351. The Oprah Winfrey Show: When They Knew, (Harpo Productions Nov. 17,
2005); see also WHEN THEY KNEW, http://www.oprah.com/spirit/When-TheyKnew (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
352. 20/20: My Secret Self: A Story of Transgendered Children, (ABC
Television Broadcast Apr. 27, 2007); see also Parents of Transgendered 6-YearOld
Girl
Support
Her
Choice,
ABC NEWS (Apr.
27,
2007),
http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=3088298&page=1.
353. Stuart Elliot, A Push to Curb the Casual Use of Ugly Phrases, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 7, 2008, at B4; see also THINK BEFORE YOU SPEAK. DON’T SAY “THAT’S SO
GAY.”, http://www.thinkb4youspeak.com (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
354. Brian Selter, Campaign Offers Hope to Gay Youths, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,
2010, at A16; see also IT GETS BETTER PROJECT, http://www.itgetsbetter.org (last
visited Apr. 19, 2013).
355. Brian Selter, Gay on TV: It’s All in the Family, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2012,
at A1.
356. Ruth Pawader, What’s So Bad About a Boy in a Dress?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Aug. 8, 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/magazine/whats-so-bad-about-a-boywho-wants-to-wear-a-dress.html?pagewanted=a118_r=0.
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B. Legalizing Children’s Queerness
To be sure, trends in academia and popular culture do
not always translate rapidly or readily into law.
Increasingly, however, there are signs that lawyers are
more willing to challenge the government’s interest in
encouraging children to be straight, and judges are more
willing to entertain these claims in challenges to policies
that discriminate against LGBT people.
In Lawrence v. Texas, attorney Paul Smith argued the
case for John Lawrence and Tyron Garner, two men who
had been convicted under a Texas sodomy law, before the
United States Supreme Court.357 In his opening argument,
Mr. Smith told the Justices that even when acts of sodomy
were not criminally prosecuted, laws against sodomy were
often invoked to justify discrimination against lesbian and
gay people in other settings: “[T]hey’re denied visitation to
their own children, they’re denied custody of children,
they’re denied public employment[, and] [t]hey’re denied
private employment.358 In response, Chief Justice Rehnquist
asked Smith whether his argument could be used to
challenge a preference for heterosexual teachers: “If you
prevail, Mr. Smith, and this law is struck down, do you
think that would also mean that a State could not prefer
heterosexuals to homosexuals to teach kindergarten?”359
Smith had prepared for general questions about how
legalizing sodomy would affect children’s sexual
development, but he had not anticipated this particular
question about the constitutionality of discrimination
against gay teachers.360 He cleared his throat,361 and for a
moment, he seemed to grasp for a way to distinguish
between the two policies. “I think the issue of—of preference
357. See Oral Argument, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102)
(as transcribed by the author).
358. Id. at 20.
359. Id.
360. DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS:
HOW A BEDROOM ARREST DECRIMINALIZED GAY AMERICANS 230 (2012).
361. Id. at 231.
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in the educational context would involve very different
criteria, Your Honor, and very different uh, uh—
considerations.”362 Regaining his footing, he modestly
proposed that “the State would have to come in with some
sort of a justification.”363
Taking up Smith’s challenge, Justice Scalia gamely
argued that the state’s justification would be “the same
that’s alluded to here, disapproval of homosexuality.”364
Smith replied, “Well, I think it would be highly—, highly
problematic, such a—justification . . . if that were the only
justification that could be offered, there was not some
showing that there would be any more concrete harm to the
children in the school.”365 Now that the tables had turned, it
was Justice Scalia who seemed to struggle to express
himself in appropriate terms: “Only that the children
might—might—might be induced to, uh—to, to—to, to
follow the path of homosexuality.”366
Given that Justice Scalia is rarely at a loss for words,
the pauses in this sentence seem especially significant. In
1978, then-Justice Rehnquist had colorfully compared the
contagiousness of homosexuality and measles,367 but by
2003, Justice Scalia was uncomfortable speaking in such
strident terms. Rather than suggesting that a gay teacher
would “seduce,” “indoctrinate,” or “recruit” children into
homosexuality, he felt compelled to articulate the fear of the
queer child in more neutral terms. But in another sign of
the times, Justice Scalia’s attempt at subtlety did not seem
to pay off with the spectators. As soon he proffered the
theory that “the child might be induced to follow the path of

362. Oral Argument, supra note 356.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. See Ratchford v. Gay Lib, 434 U.S. 1080, 1084 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
367. Id.
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homosexuality,” the noises from the gallery were audible:
some laughed; others groaned.368
Of course, Paul Smith did neither; he did not have such
luxuries. He could have replied that Justice Scalia’s claim
was absurd because homosexuality was not a “path,” or
anything that a child would learn to “follow” simply by
taking kindergarten classes from a gay teacher. But as
Smith later explained, he did not want to get himself mired
in “complicated questions of whether sexual orientation is
genetic or developed, chosen or unchosen, fixed or
immutable.”369 At the same time, however, he did not want
to concede that Justice Scalia’s claim was factually valid, or
that the state could legitimately prefer heterosexuals as
kindergarten teachers.370
Instead of challenging Justice Scalia on empirical
grounds, Smith replied that the logic of his argument was
effectively circular, because it was based on nothing more
than animus against lesbian and gay people:
Well, I—I think the State has to have a greater justification for its
discrimination than we prefer pushing people towards
heterosexuality. That amounts to the same thing as disapproval of
people’s choices in this area and there has to be a more—more
reasons and justifiable distinction than simply we prefer this
group of people, the majority, instead of this group of people, the
371
minority.

The year after Lawrence was decided, Smith’s argument
was taken up by Judge Rosemary Barkett, in her dissent
from the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to uphold Florida’s ban
against lesbian and gay adoptions:
[T]he panel suggests that placing children with homosexual
parents may make it more likely that children will become
homosexual, referring cryptically to the “vital role that dualgender parenting plays in shaping sexual and gender identity and
in providing heterosexual role modeling.” In our democracy,
368. Compare YOSHINO, supra note 100, at 106, with CARPENTER, supra note
360, at 231.
369. CARPENTER, supra note 360, at 230.
370. Id.
371. Oral Argument, supra note 356, at 21.
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however, it is not the province of the State, even if it were able to do
so, to dictate or even attempt to influence how its citizens should
develop their sexual and gender identities. This approach views
homosexuality in and of itself as a social harm that must be
discouraged, and so demeans the dignity of homosexuals,
372
something that Lawrence specifically proscribes.

Most recently, the litigation over California’s
Proposition 8 produced an opinion that offers the most
hopeful sign that the fear may finally be falling into judicial
disfavor. In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Chief Judge Vaughn
Walker invalidated Proposition 8, the California ballot
initiative that banned same-sex couples from marrying.373
During the Perry trial, the sponsors of Prop 8 sought to
show that they had organized the initiative “to protect our
children from learning about same-sex marriage in school,”
but they declined to explain why children should be
protected from learning about this particular subject.374 In
his ruling, Judge Walker rejected this concern as a pretext
for another fear—the fear of the queer child—which he
noted the sponsors had not been willing to articulate in
court.375 In his factual findings, he determined that the Prop
8 campaign had “insinuated that learning about same-sex
marriage could make a child gay or lesbian and that parents
should dread having a gay or lesbian child.”376 He returned
to this theme in his legal analysis, insisting that the
campaign “played on a fear that exposure to homosexuality
would turn children into homosexuals and that parents
should dread having a gay or lesbian child.”377
To support these findings, Judge Walker cited to the
campaign commercial It’s Already Happened, noting that
the advertisement portrays a “mother’s expression of horror
upon realizing her daughter now knows she can marry a
372. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1300
(11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
373. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 988, 1003 (N.D. Cal.
2010).
374. Id. at 1003.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 988 (emphasis added).
377. Id. at 1003 (emphasis added).
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princess.”378 Drawing on the testimony of historian George
Chauncey to place the campaign advertisements in
“historical context,” he found that the ads “echo[ed]
messages from previous campaigns to enact legal measures
to disadvantage gays and lesbians” by drawing on the same
“fear-inducing messages.”379 As Judge Walker explained,
“[t]he campaign relied heavily on negative stereotypes about
gays and lesbians and focused on protecting children from
inchoate threats vaguely associated with gays and
lesbians.”380
In his legal analysis, Judge Walker never fully clarified
whether he rejected these fears on factual or legal grounds,
though he seemed to rely on an unspoken combination of
both factors. On the one hand, he found that “[t]he evidence
at trial shows those fears to be completely unfounded”;381 on
the other, he reasoned that “[m]oral disapproval alone is an
improper basis on which to deny rights to gay men and
lesbians.”382 Yet by labeling the opposition’s concerns about
children’s sexual development as “fear,” “dread,” and
“horror”—and by linking them to older, discredited
stereotypes that portrayed lesbians and gay men as child
molesters—he strongly implied that the state had no
legitimate interest in encouraging children to be straight or
discouraging them from being queer.383
C. Theorizing No Promo Hetero
The question remains how to develop this promising
trend into a normative challenge to the fear of the queer
child—a broad principle that can be translated into liberal
theory and legal doctrine, and applied to the full panoply of
anti-LGBT policies that the fear has been invoked to defend.
The constitutional questions are too numerous and complex
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
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to broach here,384 but the underlying theoretical principle
can be briefly summarized.
Nearly twenty years ago, in her essay Queering the
State,385 queer theorist Lisa Duggan proposed a novel way
for the LGBT movement to answer the opposition’s “No
Promo Homo” campaigns. Rather than insisting that
homosexuality was innate or immutable, she urged queer
activists to launch a “No Promo Hetero” campaign—a
comprehensive attack against the state’s promotion of
heterosexuality through public institutions, policies, and
practices.386
To challenge the fear of the queer child on normative
grounds, this Article adopts Duggan’s conceptualization of
No Promo Hetero, emphasizing a few particulars that are
especially relevant. First, it stresses that No Promo Hetero
applies to children, not only to adults.387 Although Duggan
attacks the state’s promotion of heterosexuality in any and
all settings, this Article has shown that the phenomenon is
especially rampant in childhood, and the opposition’s
rhetoric often trades on the idea that children are especially
vulnerable to the dynamics of indoctrination, role modeling,
and public approval. Given the particular anxieties that
attend children’s sexual and gender development, it seems
384. Part III of this Article offers a hint of these complexities. For decades,
opponents of LGBT rights have used the fear of the queer child as a kind of an
all-purpose tool, a justification for all manner of anti-LGBT policies. In some
cases, it has been invoked to justify policies that aim to directly target children’s
queerness, such as rules that prohibit students from attending a school dance
with a same-sex partner, wearing gender variant clothes while attending school,
and advocating for LGBT rights. In many more cases, the fear has been invoked
to justify policies that seek to indirectly target children’s queerness, such as
laws against same-sex sodomy, marriage, and adoption, or policies against
hiring gay teachers, among other role models. To assess the fear’s legitimacy as
a justification in all of these settings, advocates will have to consider whether
the state has any legitimate interest in discouraging children’s queerness—in
any settings, and under any circumstances. In a forthcoming article, I examine
this question in detail. See Clifford J. Rosky, No Promo Hetero: Children’s Right
to be Queer, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2221404.
385. Duggan, supra note 8.
386. Id. at 8-9.
387. Id.
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valuable (if not vital) to respond to these fears by
specifically
attacking
the
state’s
promotion
of
heterosexuality in children and childhood.388
Second, this Article notes that No Promo Hetero bars
the state from promoting more than just “Hetero.”
Alongside Duggan’s objection to the state’s promotion of
heterosexuality,389 this Article adds a parallel challenge to
the state’s promotion of gender conformity. Given that in
recent years, the fear of the queer child has shifted
noticeably toward attacks on gender variance in childhood,
it seems useful to emphasize that No Promo Hetero and No
Promo Trans must go hand in hand.390 So although “No
Promo Hetero” is catchy, one must remember that “Hetero”
is shorthand for a broader concept like “heteronormativity”
or “straightness,” and for a broader principle that the state
may not discourage children from being or becoming queer.
Finally, this Article clarifies that No Promo Hetero bars
the state from doing more than just “Promo.” In addition to
prohibiting the state from encouraging children’
straightness, it bars the state from discouraging children’s
queerness. Although this corollary was clearly implied by
Duggan’s argument, it is worth clarifying this principle as a
matter of theory and law. Because straightness and
queerness are not mutually exclusive—think of bisexuality
and asexuality—encouraging one and discouraging the
other are not necessarily equivalent. Yet both objectives are
388. This suggestion parallels my amendment to Eskridge’s No Promo Homo
framework and is justified by the same reasoning. See discussion supra Part
III.A.
389. In her essay, Duggan often invokes the terms “heterosexuality” and
“heteronormativity” alongside each other. See, e.g., Duggan, supra note 8, at 911. Although she explicitly borrows the term “heteronormative” from Michael
Warner, she does not articulate a distinction between heterosexuality and
heteronormativity, nor does she specifically refer to the promotion of gender
conformity in her argument. Id. at 14 n.14. Given that anti-LGBT rhetoric has
recently shifted back toward an emphasis on children’s gender deviance, it
seems useful to emphasize that the principle prohibits the state from
encouraging children to conform with traditional gender norms.
390. See discussion supra Part I.B.2; see also Appleton, supra note 349, at 13132; Ball, supra note 231, at 694; Sedgwick, How To Bring Your Kids Up Gay,
supra note 23, at 20.
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based on normative assumptions about the virtues of
straightness and the vices of queerness, which cannot be
untangled from one another. Under a regime of No Promo
Hetero, the state is foreclosed from pursuing either of these
dubious goals.
With these adjustments in mind, this Article’s
normative challenge can be boiled down to a single
sentence: the state may not encourage children to be straight
or discourage children from being queer. Even if the fear’s
empirical premise were correct—even if exposing children to
queerness will make them more likely to be queer—this fact
would not be morally, legally, or politically relevant. The
government has no legitimate interest in discouraging
queerness in childhood, because it has no interest in
discouraging queerness at any age.
CONCLUSION
In one form or another, the fear of the queer child has
been with us for centuries, if not millennia. For most of this
history, it was expressed only in sexual terms, as a claim
that children would be seduced into queerness. During the
1970s, the fear was refined and reformulated by opponents
of LGBT rights, in reaction to the early gains of the LGBT
movement. Alongside ancient fears of seduction, opponents
added the seemingly kinder, gentler fears of indoctrination,
role modeling, and public approval.
With only a few exceptions, the LGBT movement has
responded to all of these fears with a common cry:
Advocates have claimed that the fear is empirically false,
because children’s sexual orientation and gender identity
are fixed early in life and cannot be learned, taught, chosen,
or changed. In recent years, however, this empirical
paradigm has seemed to exhaust itself, as advocates run up
against the inherent limitations and uncertainties of the
perennial debate over nature and nurture.
Thanks to the LGBT movement’s remarkable progress,
a new paradigm has begun to percolate among activists,
experts, and litigators. This Article argues that the time has
come for LGBT advocates to supplement the movement’s
panoply of empirical challenges with a new set of normative
challenges to the premise that children’s queerness is
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harmful, immoral, and inferior. Without calling upon the
state to celebrate children’s queerness, LGBT advocates
should argue that the government has no legitimate
interest in encouraging children to be straight or
discouraging children from being queer. The fear of the
queer child cannot be a rational justification for anti-LGBT
policies, because encouraging straightness and discouraging
queerness are not among the government’s legitimate goals.

